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I. Introduction
The Arizona State quarterback wearing number “9” on
Electronic Arts’ NCAA Football 2005 video game is a 6′4″, 235pound specimen of an athlete.1 He wears a black wristband on his
right throwing arm and a white quarterback wristband on his
left.2 His uniform includes the “Nike swoosh” on the left shoulder
just to the side of the jersey’s gold collar.3 The quarterback’s
maroon helmet has a gold stripe down the center and features a
facemask resembling a “Schutt OPO,” the design currently worn
by National Football League (NFL) quarterbacks Tom Brady and
Tony Romo.4
1. See NCAA FOOTBALL 2005 (Electronic Arts, Inc. 2004) (showing this
character as a toned, fit player).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Greg Hanlon, Nine of a Kind: Grills, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/01/15/magazine/nine-of-a-kindfootball-helmets.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting that quarterbacks favor
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The Rutgers University quarterback wearing the number
“13” jersey appears equally lifelike in this same game.5 He is a bit
smaller than his Arizona State counterpart, listed in the game at
6′2″, 197 pounds.6 He wears two white wristbands and has a
similar “Nike swoosh” on his left shoulder.7 His facemask
resembles the lightweight “Schutt OPO-SW” that is also popular
among professional quarterbacks.8 It is nearly impossible to miss
his thick eye black.9
A college football fan who plays the game and is familiar with
Sam Keller will certainly recognize Arizona State’s number “9” as
representing Keller, and anyone not familiar with Keller can
clearly see the similarity between his picture and the image used
in NCAA Football. Ryan Hart, the Rutgers quarterback, is
equally identifiable in the game, down to the remarkably similar
skin tone. The characters in the game, while not identified as
Keller and Hart by name, have the same biological statistics,
home states, and playing styles as the real quarterbacks who
both had moderately successful college football careers but who
were by no means All-Americans.10
this facemask because of its “large ‘view-box’”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
5. NCAA FOOTBALL 2005, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Hanlon, supra note 4 (noting that quarterbacks like Aaron Rodgers
prefer this facemask because it is lightweight).
9. NCAA FOOTBALL 2005, supra note 1.
10. See Sam Keller Stats, SPORTS REFERENCE, http://www.sportsreference.com/cfb/players/sam-keller-1.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting
that Keller accumulated forty touchdown passes and almost 5,500 passing yards
in three seasons at Arizona State and one at Nebraska, and that he is famous
for starting his first game in the 2004 Sun Bowl where he led the Sun Devils to
a comeback victory over Purdue) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Ryan Hart Stats, SPORTS REFERENCE, http://www.sportsreference.com/cfb/players/ryan-hart-1.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting
that Hart finished with fifty-two touchdown passes and nearly 8,500 passing
yards in four years playing for the Scarlet Knights, leading the Big East in pass
completions and completion percentage during his junior year in 2004) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Neither athlete played in the
National Football League. See Sam Keller, NFL PLAYERS, http://www.
nfl.com/player/samkeller/770/profile (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting that
Keller played zero NFL seasons and has no NFL statistics) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Ryan Hart News, Rumors and Stats, KFFL,
http://www.kffl.com/player/14562/nfl/ryan-hart (last visited Jan. 27, 2015)
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Both Keller and Hart sued Electronic Arts for violating their
rights of publicity.11 The right of publicity is a common-law
doctrine that some states have statutorily adopted.12 Although
defined differently by the states that recognize it, the right of
publicity is broadly recognized as an individual’s right to protect
her name and persona from commercial exploitation.13 The issue
in Keller’s and Hart’s cases is whether the First Amendment
right to free speech protects Electronic Arts’ use of the plaintiffs’
likenesses in the NCAA Football games or whether the former
athletes’ publicity rights outweigh Electronic Arts’ constitutional
interests.14 The Third and Ninth Circuits recently held in Hart v.
Electronic Arts, Inc.15 and In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litigation (Keller),16 respectively, that
Electronic Arts violated Hart’s and Keller’s rights of publicity.17
The amount of attention devoted to video game cases in
recent right of publicity scholarship reveals that the video game

(noting that the New York Giants cut Hart after minicamp in 2006) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
11. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (D.N.J. 2011); In re
NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Litig. (Keller), No. C 09–1967 CW,
2010 WL 5644656, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010).
12. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting
that the right of publicity is a state-based common law doctrine and is distinct
from the federal Lanham Act, a federal trademark law); infra notes 83–84
(listing the states that have adopted the right of publicity either by statute or
through common law).
13. See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th
Cir. 2009) (noting that the right of publicity under Georgia law is “[an
individual’s] right to the exclusive use of his or her name and likeness” (quoting
Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982))).
14. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 771 (framing the issue as “whether the
First Amendment grants EA the right to impinge upon Plaintiff’s New Jersey
common law right of publicity”); Keller, 2010 WL 5644656, at *1 (framing the
issue as whether Electronic Arts, the NCAA, and the Collegiate Licensing
Company “conspired to deprive [the plaintiffs] of their rights of publicity”).
15. 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013).
16. 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
17. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 170 (concluding that Electronic Arts’ games did
not “sufficiently transform” Hart’s likeness and that Electronic Arts thus
violated Hart’s right of publicity); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271 (affirming the district
court’s judgment that the plaintiffs’ right of publicity claim trumped Electronic
Arts’ First Amendment interests).
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context is a hot-button area in need of consistency.18 As Rhonda
Trotter notes, “With the rapid growth of the videogame industry
in recent years, videogames have become fertile ground for right
of publicity claims stemming from unauthorized use of a
celebrity’s persona.”19 Applying the right of publicity in the video
game context is relatively new because the right of publicity
predates video games.20 Hart and Keller, however, are not the
first of their kind.21 In previous right of publicity cases in the
video game context, courts have primarily considered and applied
three tests: the Rogers22 test, the transformative use test, and the
predominant use test.23
Scholars and judges have criticized each test, and courts
disagree on what test to use in the video game context.24 As
Jordan Blanke observes, “Even when courts apply the same test
to the same facts, results are inconsistent.”25 The opposite
18. See 3 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 24:4 (2013)
(describing the conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment
and devoting significant attention to the video game context in discussing the
cases and the three major tests).
19. Rhonda R. Trotter, Issues in Music, Television, and Videogame
Litigation in the Digital Age, ASPATORE, Dec. 2013, at 5.
20. See Alan Wilcox, Regulating Violence in Video Games: Virtually
Everything, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 253, 256–57 (2011)
(discussing the origin of video games, noting that scholars disagree on what the
first video game actually was, and describing how early video games were
unsophisticated).
21. See infra Part III.B (describing three other important video game right
of publicity cases from 2006, 2008, and 2011).
22. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
23. See infra Part III (describing the origins, specifics, and application of
each test).
24. See Charles Bahlert, College Football, Electronic Arts, and the Right of
Publicity: Reality-Mimicking Run Amok, 18 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 149, 158–66
(2014) (criticizing each of the existing tests); Jordan M. Blanke, No Doubt About
It—You’ve Got to Have Hart: Simulation Video Games May Redefine the Balance
Between and Among the Right of Publicity, the First Amendment, and Copyright
Law, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 63 (2013) (noting that different courts apply
different tests).
25. Blanke, supra note 24, at 63; see also Bahlert, supra note 24, at 155
(“First Amendment challenges to the right of publicity have led to a number of
disparate tests and subsequent unpredictable results.”); Joseph Gutmann, Note,
It’s in the Game: Redefining the Transformative Use Test for the Video Game
Arena, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 222 (2012) (“Courts deciding on the
same video game have come to different conclusions despite using the same
test.”); Alex Wyman, Defining the Modern Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. REV. ENT.
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outcomes at the district court level in Hart and Keller highlight
this inconsistency and uncertainty.26 The number of tests and
inconsistent application of each test spawn many problems,
including a decreased incentive for creating video games because
companies cannot anticipate whether their products will violate
an individual’s right of publicity.27 The result of these problems
is, as Timothy Bucher observes, that “something must be done,
and soon, to reroute the right of publicity and First Amendment
jurisprudence” as it relates to cases like those discussed in this
Note.28 Although scholars have suggested different approaches to
remedy the problems,29 the recent NCAA Football decisions
necessitate reevaluating the current tests and possible
alternatives.

& SPORTS L. 167, 167 (2014) (“[T]he framework for litigating this right has
become impossibly muddled. . . . The consequences of this confusion are farreaching and have become more troubling as the right of publicity has
expanded.”). Alex Wyman asserts that the variation among different states’
right of publicity laws is a large contributor to the confusion. “Primarily, these
problems result from varied approaches taken by both state and federal courts
in addressing right of publicity claims. . . . [T]he right of publicity is
inconsistently applied because its regulation has been delegated to the states.”
Id. at 168.
26. See Timothy J. Bucher, Game On: Sports-Related Games and the
Contentious Interplay Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment,
14 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 19 (2012) (arguing that the different district
court outcomes in Hart and Keller “demonstrate the need for the Supreme Court
to set forth a clear standard so that courts can consistently determine the
appropriate interplay between the right of publicity and the First Amendment”);
Gutmann, supra note 25, at 248 (“Even the most popular test is unequipped to
deal with modern issues such as video games, leading to completely
contradictory opinions like Keller and Hart.”).
27. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 151 (“Unpredictability creates a chilling
effect at the clearance level and barricades otherwise protected speech behind a
wall of uncertainty.”). Susannah M. Rooney, Note, Just Another Brown-Eyed
Girl: Toward a Limited Federal Right of Publicity Under the Lanham Act in a
Digital Age of Celebrity Dominance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 921, 941 (2013) (“These
tests are applied inconsistently, and consequently, creators cannot confidently
determine whether their works will fall within the realm of the protected speech
or will infringe on the right of publicity. This issue implicates free speech
concerns because it serves to effectively chill some forms of creative speech.”).
28. Bucher, supra note 26, at 22.
29. See infra Part IV (describing many alternative approaches including
Joseph Gutmann’s suggested “redefined transformative test” that classifies a
game as either an altered reality or an imitation of life).
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This Note reexamines the three major existing alternatives
and concludes that none of them is an effective standard that
courts can apply consistently.30 It addresses this problem by
proposing an alternative test that will be easier for courts to
apply consistently, will protect video game producers’ reasonable
expectations, and is designed specifically for balancing the right
of publicity with the First Amendment in the video game
context.31
Part II discusses the development of the right of publicity,
the right’s origin, its policy justifications, and how it differs in
various states.32 Part III outlines the major right of publicity
precedent, including both the foundational right of publicity cases
and those in the video game context.33 Part IV examines scholars’
suggestions for resolving the inconsistencies in right of publicity
cases.34 Part V establishes this Note’s suggested approach, the
readily identifiable standard, and explains how a court applying
this standard would evaluate the video game cases addressed in
Part III.B.35
II. The Right of Publicity: Origin, History, and Development
A. Source of the Right
The Second Circuit coined the term “right of publicity” in its
1953 opinion Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.36 The Haelan court considered two parties’ competing claims
that they owned exclusive rights to use a baseball player’s
photograph to help sell gum.37 The defendant contended that the
30. See infra Part V.A (explaining why none of the three currently
considered tests solve the problem).
31. See infra Part V.B (introducing the readily identifiable standard and
explaining how it accomplishes these goals).
32. Infra Part II.
33. Infra Part III.
34. Infra Part IV.
35. Infra Part V.
36. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953) (introducing the term).
37. See id. at 867 (noting that the baseball player had entered into two
exclusive contracts with rival gum manufacturers of the same type and
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baseball player had only a right of privacy interest in his
picture.38 The Second Circuit rejected this argument and found
instead that “a man has a right in the publicity value of his
photograph.”39 The court distinguished the right of publicity from
privacy rights, which are neither assignable nor economic in
nature.40 It reasoned that this new right was necessary to protect
celebrities’ ability to profit from their own identities and claimed
that New York precedent, including the famous Wood v. Lucy,
Lady Duff-Gordon,41 provided a basis for the right.42
Melville B. Nimmer unraveled what a right of publicity
should look like a year later in his article The Right of Publicity.
Nimmer examined the right of privacy, unfair competition, and
other doctrines and concluded that these theories inadequately
protected a celebrity’s right to profit from her image.43 He noted
that the judiciary had not yet recognized the right of publicity
other than in Haelan but agreed with the Haelan court that
existing precedent “indicated a judicial willingness to extend
protection to publicity values which would not be protect[a]ble
under the traditional legal theories.”44 Nimmer thus advocated
that future courts create a right of publicity that accounted for
both “the economic reality of pecuniary values inherent in
considering which company had the right to use the player’s image).
38. See id. at 868 (explaining the defendant’s argument that “a man has no
legal interest in the publication of his picture other than his right of privacy”).
39. See id. (“This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”).
40. See id. (explaining that the right of publicity is “in addition to and
independent of that right to privacy”).
41. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). Then-Judge Cardozo concluded in this brief
opinion that an agreement between an employer and employee contained an
implied promise that amounted to a contract because the writing was “instinct
with an obligation, imperfectly expressed.” Id. at 214 (internal quotations
omitted). The case has since become “one of the most enduring and influential
cases in the contracts pantheon.” James J. Fishman, The Enduring Legacy of
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV. 162, 162 (2008).
42. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868
(2d Cir. 1953) (noting the need to protect “prominent persons” like entertainers
and athletes and arguing that multiple New York cases supported the court’s
position).
43. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 203, 204–15 (1954) (insisting that each of these doctrines has flaws that
prohibit them from fully protecting what a right of publicity will protect).
44. Id. at 218.

“GROOVE IS IN THE HART”

325

publicity” and “the inadequacy of traditional legal theories in
protecting such publicity values.”45
B. Defining the Right of Publicity
As noted above, Haelan coined the right of publicity as a
right distinct from that of privacy.46 The main distinction
between the rights of publicity and privacy is that the right of
publicity protects an “individual’s persona” whereas the right of
privacy safeguards “conventional work[s] of authorship” among
other more general privacy interests.47 Although the right of
publicity protects both celebrities and noncelebrities,48 it is
invoked almost exclusively by celebrities because people who are
not famous face a much lower risk of economic exploitation of
their personas.49 It thus makes sense that the right of publicity
originated as Americans’ fascination with celebrities began to
take off.50 The right to privacy, conversely, is often used by both
45. Id. at 215.
46. See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868 (explaining that the court was creating the
right of publicity in addition to the existing right of privacy).
47. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 34 (2010).
48. See Waits v. Frito–Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1992)
(concluding that the right of publicity protects individuals “who fall short of
superstardom”); Cheatham v. Paisano Publ’ns, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D.
Ky. 1995) (noting that a plaintiff has a remedy only if her identity has a
commercial value but arguing that “celebrity status should not be an absolute
prerequisite”); Ann Margaret Eames, Caught on Tape: Exposing the Unsettled
and Unpredictable State of the Right of Publicity, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 41, 51
(2004) (explaining that the right of publicity has evolved to a point that it now
protects everyone, not just celebrities). But see Bahlert, supra note 24, at 154
(“Some jurisdictions only grant the right of publicity to famous people, while
others permit its use by every individual.”); Wyman, supra note 25, at 170
(“Another issue exacerbated by the confusion among states and courts is exactly
who may assert the right of publicity. Specifically, there is no consensus on
whether the right of publicity is reserved for celebrities or whether all
individuals have such a right.”).
49. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834
(6th Cir. 1983) (noting that the right of publicity protects “commercial
exploitation” of one’s identity and thus individuals with an identity capable of
exploiting have more use for it). In addition to being invoked primarily by
celebrities, the right of publicity developed specifically to protect them. Id. at
835.
50. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 111 (crediting the “fame phenomenon” for
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celebrities and noncelebrities because it is broader and includes
elements like the right to “seclusion or solitude” that celebrities
and noncelebrities can equally enjoy.51
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (the
Restatement) accurately summarizes what the right of publicity
generally protects.52 Section 46 provides that the right of
publicity guards an individual’s right to profit from his own
identity and thus prohibits people from exploiting another’s
identity without consent.53 Intent to violate another’s right of
publicity is not normally an element of liability,54 although some
courts and scholars suggest that it should be.55 Consumer
confusion, which is often about “whether the celebrity endorsed
the product,”56 is also not necessary.57 Because the right of
necessitating the right of publicity).
51. Carson, 698 F.2d at 834. Roberta Kwall distinguishes the right of
publicity from the right of privacy by arguing that the former is “the means of
achieving compensation for the loss of financial gain associated with a
defendant’s unauthorized appropriation” whereas the latter concerns “hurt
feelings.” KWALL, supra note 47, at 119; accord Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65
F.3d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The right to publicity protects pecuniary, not
emotional, interests.”).
52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–49 (1995)
(describing what the right of publicity protects, how the right is violated, and
what the appropriate damages are).
53. See id. § 46 (“One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s
identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of
identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate
under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.”); see also Marc Edelman, Closing the
“Free Speech” Loophole: The Case for Protecting College Athletes’ Publicity
Rights in Commercial Video Games, 65 FLA. L. REV. 553, 560 (2013) (“In almost
all states, a prima facie claim for violating one’s right of publicity requires the
showing of four elements: (1) the use of one’s identity; (2) for purposes of a
commercial advantage; (3) without consent; and (4) in a manner that causes
monetary harm.”).
54. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988)
(explaining that, under Zacchini, “actual malice” does not apply to the right of
publicity); § 46 cmt. e (providing that a plaintiff does not have the burden of
proving intent).
55. See Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977)
(noting that the Ohio Supreme Court had considered intent); Gutmann, supra
note 25, at 234–35 (maintaining that the right of publicity test in the video
game context must account for a manufacturer’s intent).
56. David M. Schlachter, Note and Comment, Adjudicating the Right of
Publicity in Three Easy Steps, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 471, 479 (2006).
57. See In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.
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publicity is a common law right that varies significantly among
the states that adopt it, there are many other elements, like
descendibility, that differ by state.58 Although differences among
states remain,59 celebrities generally have more right of publicity
protection in the United States than abroad.60
C. Justifying the Right of Publicity
As already noted, the broad rationale for the right of
publicity is protecting celebrities’ rights to profit commercially
from their own fame.61 As the Supreme Court explained in
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co.,62 “The
rationale . . . is the straightforward one of preventing unjust
enrichment by the theft of good will.”63 Fairness is thus the
(Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1281 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The right of publicity protects the
celebrity, not the consumer.”); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th
Cir. 2003) (noting that a right of publicity claim differs from a false advertising
claim because a right of publicity claim does not require evidence of consumer
confusion); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b–c (1995)
(noting that “[p]roof of deception or consumer confusion is not required for the
imposition of liability”).
58. See § 46 cmt. h (1995) (explaining that some states have not considered
whether the right of publicity is descendible while others have made the right
descendible only under certain conditions).
59. See infra Part II.D (examining these differences).
60. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 34 (noting that despite the similarities
between publicity rights and moral rights, the United States “is a leader among
nations in protecting publicity rights” while offering little protection of moral
rights).
61. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835
(6th Cir. 1983) (“The theory of the right is that a celebrity’s identity can be
valuable in the promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that
may be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that
identity.”); Nimmer, supra note 43, at 216 (insisting that “every person is
entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing
public policy considerations”).
62. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
63. Id. at 576. Justice White wrote that “the [s]tate’s interest in permitting
a ‘right of publicity’ . . . is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright
law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors
and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation.” Id. at 573; accord
§ 46 cmt. c (explaining that the right of publicity is designed to prevent freeriding off of celebrities’ hard-earned reputations, especially exploitation that
would diminish celebrities’ reputations).
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doctrine’s foundation.64 Although the right of publicity’s
justification seems straightforward, Susannah Rooney suggests a
more complex, multifaceted policy rationale.65 Rooney’s theory
focuses on the right of publicity in general, but her reasoning is
also applicable to the right of publicity’s necessity in the video
game context.66
First, Rooney proposes that the right of publicity protects
moral rights similar to the way that copyright law operates
abroad.67 This first theory does not deal with incentivizing
creativity but instead recognizes an inherent right to control one’s
reputation and identity.68 The theory is that moral rights are a
broad category and that the right of publicity deals solely with
these rights in the context of an individual’s likeness.69 Sean
Whaley suggests that this moral rights concept relates back to
John Locke’s theory of natural rights, which partially relies on
the assumption that “every man has a right to own that which he
has mixed his labor with.”70 In the video game context, this moral
64. See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (“It is unfair that one should be permitted to commercialize or
exploit or capitalize upon another’s name, reputation or accomplishments
merely because the owner’s accomplishments have been highly publicized.”
(emphasis added)).
65. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 927 (observing that “[t]hree major schools
of thought have evolved regarding the policy reasons behind the right of
publicity”).
66. See id. at 941–44 (discussing Hart and Keller and arguing that they
demonstrate the need for a federal right of publicity).
67. See id. at 927 (explaining the theory of moral rights and noting that
American copyright law does not account for this theory).
68. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003)
(defining the right of publicity as “the inherent right of every human being to
control the commercial use of his or her identity”); Rooney, supra note 27, at 927
(distinguishing this “inherent moral right” from a right arising from diligence
and effort).
69. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 162 (suggesting that the right of publicity
is only one of many ways in which laws protect moral rights).
70. Sean D. Whaley, “I’m a Highway Star”: An Outline for a Federal Right
of Publicity, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 263 (2009); see also A. JOHN
SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 68–78 (1992) (discussing the basis for
Locke’s theory of natural rights and explaining how Locke viewed various
rights). But see GILLIAN BLACK, PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND IMAGE: EXPLOITATION AND
LEGAL CONTROL 97–99 (2011) (rejecting the theory that the right of publicity is
needed as an “individual’s desert or reward” for labor because a celebrity’s fame
is often the result of luck and good fortune rather than hard work).
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rights theory means that a celebrity has the innate right to
choose what games to appear in and not appear in.71
Second, Rooney finds economics to be a major rationale for
the right of publicity.72 Tragedy of the commons logic requires
limiting the use of publicity to prevent dilution of the value of
celebrities’ personas.73 The more obvious economic rationale is
the need to incentivize advances in creativity, just as in copyright
law.74 If celebrities’ images are exploitable at will, individuals will
have less incentive to work toward fame and fortune.75 Because
many celebrities are famous for making major contributions that
better society, there is a policy interest in encouraging and
preserving such initiative.76 The policy of incentivizing fame
applies in the video game context, where there is also a strong
need to incentivize video game companies’ creativity.
Lastly, Rooney argues that the right of publicity is necessary
to prevent consumer confusion.77 Similar to the rationale behind
trademark law, “there must not be an unauthorized link to a
brand or, in the case of publicity, a person.”78 As noted above, a
71. See infra notes 269–270 (explaining that the right of publicity is a
moral right because a celebrity’s right to choose not to appear in a video game
might be based on a moral objection).
72. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 927–28 (identifying and describing two
economic theories that justify the right of publicity).
73. See id. at 928 (noting that overuse can dilute and even destroy publicity
and thus recognizing the need to control the use of publicity).
74. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 94–95 (analogizing the right of publicity to
copyright law based on the policy goal of encouraging creativity and
advancement); Rooney, supra note 27, at 928 (noting that this rationale “mirrors
the justifications for copyright and patent” law).
75. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 126 (explaining the correlation between
the protection of publicity rights and the incentive to invest in one’s persona);
Rooney, supra note 27, at 928 (arguing that the right of publicity incentivizes
celebrities by design). But see Recent Case, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name
& Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L.
REV. 1212, 1217 (2014) [hereinafter Recent Case] (“[T]here are already ample
incentives to pursue fame. . . . Thus, the marginal incentive provided by the
right of publicity is likely to be negligible.”).
76. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 928 (providing that identities need
protection if they “can be viewed as valuable to society and as useful tools of
business”).
77. See id. (explaining how the right of publicity helps to prevent consumer
confusion).
78. Id.
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right of publicity claim does not require proof of consumer
confusion.79 This justification nevertheless applies in the video
game context because consumers playing a video game may, and
often do, rationally believe that a celebrity featured in that game
endorsed the game and consented to her inclusion.80
Several justifications for the right of publicity exist, all of
which are relevant in the video game context. Part V.A argues
that courts and legislatures must tailor the test for whether a
video game infringes an individual’s right of publicity toward
these justifications.81
D. How Various States Apply the Right of Publicity
While the above subpart spells out the justifications behind
the right of publicity, many states do not recognize the right.82
Nineteen states have statutorily adopted the right of publicity.83
79. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that courts and
legislatures did not design the right of publicity to protect consumers).
80. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 61–62 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (noting the issue of consumers mistakenly believing that Kirby
endorsed the video game); Brandon Johansson, Note, Pause the Game: Are Video
Game Manufacturers Punting Away the Publicity Rights of Retired Athletes?, 10
NEV. L.J. 784, 810 (2010) (arguing that sports video games present “a high
likelihood of consumer confusion regarding the athlete’s endorsement of the
game”). But see BLACK, supra note 70, at 100 (insisting that consumer confusion
is not a legitimate justification for the right of publicity because “[m]embers of
the public are no longer, if they ever were, likely to believe wholeheartedly that
a celebrity uses or believes in the product she advertises”).
81. See infra Part V.A. (arguing that a workable test needs to be consistent
to account for consumers’, celebrities’, and video game companies’ reasonable
expectations).
82. See Brittany A. Adkins, Comment, Crying Out for Uniformity:
Eliminating State Inconsistencies in Right of Publicity Protection Through a
Uniform Right of Publicity Act, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 499, 500–01 (2010) (observing
that the right is not uniformly applied even within the states that recognize it).
83. Id. These nineteen states are California, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344, 3344.1
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (Westlaw
through 2013 Sess.); Illinois, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 1075/10 to /60 (Westlaw
through 2013 Sess.); Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 32-36-1-1 to -20 (Westlaw through
2013 First Regular Sess.); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West,
Westlaw through 2013 First Regular Sess. and 2013 Extraordinary Sess.);
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (Westlaw through Chapter 25 of
the 2014 Second Annual Sess.); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202 (Westlaw
through 2013 Sess.); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 597.770–597.810 (Westlaw
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Twelve others recognize the doctrine through common law, some
by a name other than the “right of publicity,” but have not
codified it.84
In the states that recognize a right of publicity, the
application and intricacies of the right differ dramatically.85
through 2013 Sess.); New York, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney,
Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2741.01–2741.99
(West, Westlaw through 2013 portion of 2013–2014 Sess.); Oklahoma, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1448, 1449 (Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); Pennsylvania, 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. § 8316 (Westlaw through 2013 legislation); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 9-1-28 to -28.1 (Westlaw through Chapter 534 of 2013 Sess.);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1102 to -1107 (Westlaw through 2013
First Regular Sess.); Texas, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001–26.015 (West,
Westlaw through 2013 Third Sess.); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6, 76-9407 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Second Special Sess.); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-40 (Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 63.60.010 to .060 (Westlaw through 2013 legislation) (but note that
Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, LTD, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122
(W.D. Wash. 2011), held part of this statute unconstitutional); and Wisconsin,
WIS. STAT. § 995.50 (Westlaw through 2013 Act 116). Adkins, supra note 82, at
500–01; Statutes, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
84. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835
(6th Cir. 1983) (recognizing the right of publicity in Michigan); Pooley v. Nat’l
Hole-in-One Ass’n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (D. Ariz. 2000) (recognizing the
right of publicity); Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 867
F. Supp. 175, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (recognizing the right of publicity in
Connecticut); Minnifield v. Ashcroft, 903 So. 2d 818, 824 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004)
(recognizing the right of publicity); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc.
Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982)
(same); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141, 144 (Haw.
1968) (same); Simpson v. Cent. Me. Motors, Inc., 669 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Me. 1996)
(same); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998)
(same); Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(same); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 460 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1967) (same); Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz, & Bettis, L.L.P., 684
S.E.2d 756, 760 (S.C. 2009) (same); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320
S.E.2d 70, 85 (W. Va. 1983) (same).
85. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 45 (noting the differences between the
right of publicity in Indiana and Washington); Adkins, supra note 82, at 505
(explaining that common differences include “the origins of state protection and
the doctrine under which protection extends,” the specifics of what is protected,
“assignability and descendibility,” requirements that the celebrity used the right
during his or her lifetime, and duration); Christina Smedley, Case Note &
Comment, Commercial Speech and the Transformative Use Test: The Necessary
Limits of a First Amendment Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 24 DEPAUL J.
ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 451, 456 (2014) (summarizing general differences
among states’ right of publicity laws); Wyman, supra note 25, at 168–69
(discussing the major differences between states’ laws and arguing that this
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Because the right of publicity is specific to states, some
scholarship advocates for a uniform right of publicity that
standardizes the right’s protections.86 While this Note does not
support that suggestion, it does endorse the readily identifiable
standard as the best way to analyze right of publicity claims in
the video game context.87 This Note argues that there are benefits
to states using the same standard for video games, but the
recommended test need not be used by all states to be effective in
those that do adopt it.88 The different state laws remain
important for discussing the video game context because the
cases arise from various jurisdictions, including California,89 New
Jersey,90 and Michigan,91 and apply those various states’ laws.
III. Precedent: Seminal Right of Publicity Cases and Cases in the
Video Game Context
This Part focuses on the cases that are critical to
understanding the problem at issue. Subpart A addresses the
general right of publicity cases that establish the tests currently
considered in the video game context and that form the basis for
this Note’s suggested readily identifiable standard.92 Subpart B
variation contributes to the problem of unpredictability in evaluating right of
publicity claims).
86. See, e.g., Adkins, supra note 82, at 505–24 (providing a comprehensive
comparison between New York’s, California’s, Tennessee’s, and Indiana’s right
of publicity statutes and arguing that the differences in state protections
necessitate a uniform right of publicity).
87. See infra Part V.B (advocating for the readily identifiable standard and
explaining why this is a better alternative than existing tests).
88. See infra Part V.B (maintaining that consistent application of the same
test would be beneficial for protecting video game manufacturers’ expectations).
89. See generally In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (arising out of California); No
Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)
(same); Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(same).
90. See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013)
(arising out of New Jersey).
91. See generally Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (arising out of Michigan).
92. See infra Part V.B (explaining the readily identifiable standard and
how it is derived from existing precedent).
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addresses the primary cases from the video game sphere that
consider and apply the tests explained in subpart A.
A. Seminal Right of Publicity Cases
1. Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co.
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co. is the only
right of publicity case the Supreme Court has decided.93 In
Zacchini, Hugo Zacchini, a human cannonball entertainer, sued a
local television broadcasting station that had both videotaped
Zacchini’s performance after he told the reporter not to do so and
showed the tape on the news.94 The Supreme Court of Ohio
recognized the right of publicity but found for the defendant.95 It
reasoned that a news station violates the right of publicity only
when the station’s intent is to “appropriate the benefit of the
publicity for some non-privileged private use” or “to injure the
individual.”96
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, finding
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require states
to privilege the press against the right of publicity.97 The Court
93. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 372 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(observing that Zacchini “is the first and only right of publicity case decided by
the Supreme Court”). The Supreme Court has, however, recently heard a video
game case with First Amendment implications. In Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association, the Court held that video games qualify for First
Amendment protection. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). Justice Scalia wrote,
Like the protected, books, plays, and movies that preceded them,
video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through
many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and
music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the
player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer
First Amendment Protection.
Id.
94. See Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563–64
(1977) (describing how Zacchini asked the reporter not to film the human
cannonball show and that the reporter videotaped the full performance the next
day).
95. See id. at 564–65 (describing the complicated procedural posture
including the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and reversal by the Ohio
Court of Appeals).
96. Id. at 565 (internal quotations omitted).
97. See id. at 578–79 (“We conclude that although the State of Ohio may as
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distinguished this case from Time, Inc. v. Hill,98 which the
Ohio Supreme Court relied on, by noting that Hill did not
involve the right of publicity. 99 The Court concluded that Hill
“does not mandate a media privilege to televise a performer’s
act without his consent.” 100 Courts today view Zacchini as a
mandate to balance individuals’ rights of publicity with the
First Amendment, but the Supreme Court unfortunately failed
to dictate what test courts should use for this balancing. 101
2. Rogers v. Grimaldi: The Rogers Test
The Second Circuit’s Rogers v. Grimaldi 102 is the next
seminal case. Rogers is a landmark right of publicity decision
from 1989 that involves a movie title rather than a video
game’s contents. 103 It remains important in the video game
context because it established the Rogers test, one of the three
tests courts have used and considered using in determining
whether a video game violates a celebrity’s right of publicity. 104
a matter of its own law privilege the press in the circumstances of this case, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.”).
98. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Hill, the Court considered whether the New
York courts had unconstitutionally denied the publisher of Life Magazine First
Amendment protections of speech and press. Id. at 376. The Court, dealing with
New York’s right of privacy statute, reasoned that the freedom of the press was
designed to benefit the public at large rather than the press itself. Id. at 389. It
held that First Amendment protections precluded applying New York’s right of
privacy statute in this case. Id. at 387–88. The Court concluded that the original
jury conclusion awarding the plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages
was reasonable, and it remanded the case. Id. at 392, 398.
99. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 572–74 (noting that this case and Hill
involved different claims and that Hill did not implicate broadcasting an act
that the performer was paid for).
100. Id. at 570.
101. See Kyle D. Simcox, Comment, Selling Your Soul at the Crossroads: The
Need for a Harmonized Standard Limiting the Publicity Rights of Professional
Athletes, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 87, 93 (2013) (noting Zacchini’s “lasting impact”
and explaining that the lack of a clear test for balancing the right of publicity
and the First Amendment is in part attributable to the Court’s failure to
establish a test).
102. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
103. See id. at 1004–05 (explaining that the case’s right of publicity issue
involves a movie title’s relationship to the plaintiff’s name).
104. See Blanke, supra note 24, at 63 (noting that the Rogers test, along
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Ginger Rogers, an actress who was most famous for her
roles in movies dancing with Fred Astaire, sued the company
and directors who produced a movie entitled Ginger and
Fred.105 The film focused on two cabaret performers who
became known as Ginger and Fred in Italy but had nothing to
do with either Rogers’s or Astaire’s actual lives. 106 Rogers sued
under three theories, and the District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted summary judgment for the
defendants.107 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
ruling.108
The Second Circuit applied Oregon law to the right of
publicity claim but noted that there was no precedent in
Oregon on the issue. 109 The court then established and adopted
the test that a movie title violates one’s right of publicity only
if “the title [is] ‘wholly unrelated’ to the movie or [is] ‘simply a
disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or
services.’”110 It found that the title Ginger and Fred was
“clearly related to the content of the movie” and thus that no
right of publicity violation occurred. 111 Although the Rogers
court’s language limits its holding to the movie title context, 112
courts have recently considered extending Rogers’s wholly
unrelated standard, or simply a disguised commercial

with the transformative use test and predominant use test, is one of three
alternatives courts have tried).
105. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996–97 (describing Rogers’s career and fame
and explaining how she commercially profited from her name).
106. See id. (describing the movie’s basic plot and its weak connection with
the lives and careers of Rogers and Astaire).
107. See id. at 997 (listing Rogers’s Lanham Act, right of publicity, and right
of privacy claims and describing the case’s early procedural posture).
108. See id. at 1005 (concluding that the district court properly rejected all
three of Rogers’s claims).
109. See id. at 1002 (observing that “there are no reported decisions of any
Oregon court on a right of publicity claim”).
110. Id. at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling–Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d
454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979) and Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768,
769 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)).
111. Id.
112. See id. (identifying that the holding applies specifically to “the use of a
celebrity’s name in a movie title”).
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advertisement standard, to the video game context. 113 The
Restatement also adopts the Rogers test.114
3. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit decided White v. Samsung
Electronics America, Inc.115 Vanna White, the popular Wheel of
Fortune personality, sued Samsung for violating her right of
publicity by using her image in an advertisement.116 The
advertisement featured a robot dressed like White posing next to
a game show board similar to the Wheel of Fortune set.117 The
court concluded that the robot’s features were “consciously
selected to resemble White’s hair and dress” and that the
advertisement’s background was “instantly recognizable as the
Wheel of Fortune game show set.”118
The Ninth Circuit held that the common law right of
publicity is not limited to appropriation of one’s “name or
likeness” as the district court below had concluded.119 It cited
113. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir. 2013)
(describing and analyzing the Rogers test but rejecting it because it is a “blunt
instrument, unfit for widespread application in cases that require a carefully
calibrated balancing”); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758,
765–66 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (citing and applying the Rogers test and concluding
that the game was not “wholly unrelated” to the plaintiffs’ song); see also Recent
Case, supra note 75, at 1218 (advocating that courts apply the Rogers test in the
video game context because it is “appropriately deferential to core protected
speech”).
114. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that the “‘[u]se of another’s identity in a novel, play, or motion
picture is . . . not ordinarily an infringement [of the right of publicity, unless]
the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not
related to the identified person’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995))).
115. 971 F.2d 1395, 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
116. See id. at 1396 (explaining that the Wheel of Fortune-themed
advertisement was one in a series of Samsung advertisements depicting
technology in the future and that White sued claiming that one of the ads was a
robotic impersonation of her identity).
117. See id. (describing the robot and the game show set).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 1397 (explaining that the district court had granted White
summary judgment on her right of publicity claim because there was no
appropriation of name or likeness and citing precedent that construed the right
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both Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.120 and Carson
v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.121 as precedent that the
right of publicity does more than prohibit an exhaustive list of
activities.122 The court explained that the right of publicity’s
decisive factor is not “how the defendant has appropriated the
plaintiff’s identity, but whether the defendant has done so.”123 The
court concluded that the ad “leave[s] little doubt about the
celebrity the ad is meant to depict” and thus held that Samsung
violated White’s right of publicity.124
Judge Alarcon, dissenting on the right of publicity issue,
vehemently advocated that the majority’s standard intruded too
far into First Amendment protections.125 He contended that
White’s prominence in the game show arena makes this case
unique because any image of a game show hostess will inevitably
remind a viewer of Vanna White.126 Judge Alarcon would thus
have adopted a more stringent test and dismissed White’s claim
because the advertisement showed a robot instead of a human
like White.127 This Note’s suggested readily identifiable standard
adopts Judge Alarcon’s view and advocates that a video game
violates the right of publicity only when an image is immediately
identifiable as definitively appropriating one’s image.128
of publicity to be much broader).
120. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
121. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
122. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.
1992) (explaining that these cases “teach the impossibility of treating the right
of publicity as guarding only against a laundry list of specific means of
appropriating identity”).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1399.
125. See id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (arguing that the record does
not support the majority’s finding that Samsung violated White’s right of
publicity).
126. See id. at 1405 (“I quite agree that anyone seeing the commercial
advertisement would be reminded of Vanna White. Any performance by another
female celebrity as a game-show hostess, however, will also remind the viewer of
Vanna White because Vanna White’s celebrity is so closely associated with the
role.”).
127. See id. at 1403 (“In this case, it is clear that a metal robot and not the
plaintiff, Vanna White, is depicted in the commercial advertisement. The record
does not show an appropriation of Vanna White’s identity.”).
128. See infra Part V.B (explaining the readily identifiable standard).
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4. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.: The
Transformative Use Test

In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,129 the
Supreme Court of California adopted the transformative use test,
which is the primary test that courts have used to evaluate right
of publicity claims relating to video games.130 Comedy III arose
from the defendant’s production and sale of t-shirts that
displayed an image that the defendant drew resembling The
Three Stooges.131 The court first described the purposes behind
both the California right of publicity statute discussed above and
the First Amendment’s freedom of expression.132 It then
concluded that balancing the two interests requires determining
whether the expression sufficiently transforms the person’s
likeness.133 The court explained that the Comedy III test, now
129. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
130. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 160 (explaining that the transformative
use test is “[c]urrently . . . the most popular test”); Blanke, supra note 24, at 63
(identifying the transformative use test as one of the three major balancing tests
that courts apply in video game right of publicity cases); Beth A. Cianfrone &
Thomas A. Baker III, The Use of Student–Athlete Likenesses in Sport Video
Games: An Application of the Right of Publicity, 20 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 35,
52–53 (2010) (explaining the test’s origin in Comedy III and its importance in
the video game context); supra Part III.B (illustrating the test’s popularity in
video game cases). Although Comedy III first adopted the transformative use
test in the right of publicity context, the test is likely based on a 1990 article by
Pierre Leval on fair use in copyright. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 221–22
(discussing Leval’s definition of a transformative use and its similarity to
Comedy III’s transformative use test). Leval articulated and explained the four
factors listed in federal copyright law for determining whether a work is a fair
use, including “the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the
copyrighted work, the quantity and importance of the material used, and the
effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work.”
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110
(1990); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing the same factors).
131. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 800–01 (explaining the defendant’s business of
“making charcoal drawings of celebrities” and noting that the business made
$75,000 selling t-shirts that featured such a drawing of The Three Stooges).
132. See id. (explaining the statute’s purpose of preventing appropriation of
individuals’ personas and the First Amendment’s dual purposes of permitting
the free flow of ideas and respecting “individual development and selfrealization” (internal quotations omitted)); supra notes 85–89 and accompanying
text (explaining California’s basic right of publicity statute).
133. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808 (“This inquiry into whether a work is
‘transformative’ appears to us to be necessarily at the heart of any judicial
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known as the transformative use test, balances the two interests
because a sufficiently transformed expression is both “especially
worthy of First Amendment protection” and “less likely to
interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of
publicity.”134
The Comedy III court extensively discussed how courts
should apply the transformative use test.135 The court explained
that considerations include (1) “whether the celebrity likeness is
one of ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is
synthesized . . . or whether [it] is the very sum and substance of
the work in question”; (2) whether the work “is so transformed
that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression”;
(3) “whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements
predominate the work”; (4) whether the work’s “marketability
and economic value . . . derive primarily from the fame of the
celebrity depicted”; and (5) whether the defendant’s goal is to
“commercially exploit” the celebrity’s fame.136 After applying
these five considerations, the court concluded that the t-shirt
design was not sufficiently transformative and that the defendant
thus violated Comedy III’s right of publicity.137
5. Winter v. DC Comics
The California Supreme Court retrenched the transformative
use test nine years after Comedy III. In Winter v. DC Comics,138
the Winters brothers, who were well-known musicians, alleged
attempt to square the right of publicity with the First Amendment.”).
134. Id.
135. See id. at 809–10 (providing guidance on what courts using the
transformative use test should consider when looking at an expressive work).
136. Id. Although the Comedy III court did not explicitly list these as
considerations, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted them as “five factors” for
courts to consider in the video game context. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name
& Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 2013). But see
id. at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Comedy III court
consciously did not label these considerations as “analytical factors” because of
the need to conduct a “holistic examination” under the transformative use test).
137. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811
(Cal. 2001) (applying the five considerations and finding that protecting the
defendant’s work would effectively nullify the right of publicity).
138. 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).
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that DC Comics violated the brothers’ rights of publicity by
appropriating their likenesses in a comic book series.139 The
comics featured two characters that physically resembled the
brothers and shared their first names.140 The court distinguished
Comedy III based on the comic books’ inherent transformative
nature.141 It held that the defendants’ comics sufficiently
transformed the Winter brothers’ likenesses and that the First
Amendment thus protected the comics.142
6. Doe v. TCI Cablevision: The Predominant Use Test
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,143 the Supreme Court of Missouri
adopted and applied the predominant use test.144 This test,
developed in 2003 after the Rogers and transformative use tests,
is the third and final standard currently relevant in right of
publicity cases in the video game context.145 Anthony “Tony”
139. See id. at 476 (explaining the Winters brothers’ careers and the comic
book series’s storyline).
140. See id. (discussing the similarities between the Winters brothers and
the comic book characters and emphasizing that the Winters brothers were from
Texas and that the comic books featured a cowboy theme).
141. See id. at 479–80 (“The artist in Comedy III . . . essentially
sold . . . pictures of The Three Stooges, not transformed expressive works by the
artist. Here, by contrast, defendants essentially sold . . . [c]omics depicting
fanciful, creative characters, not pictures of the Winter brothers. This makes all
the difference.”). The Winters court’s distinction indicates that it would have
accepted Judge Alarcon’s argument and decided White differently because the
robot in White was a “fanciful, creative character[ ]” rather than a picture of
White. See id. (distinguishing the creativity in Winter from the picture of The
Three Stooges at issue in Comedy III).
142. See id. at 480 (summarizing the court’s transformative use test
analysis).
143. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
144. See id. at 374 (quoting and citing Mark Lee’s formulation of this test
and using the test to conclude that the right of publicity outweighed the First
Amendment in this case).
145. See Blanke, supra note 24, at 63 (including the predominant use test as
one of the three major balancing tests used by courts in video game right of
publicity cases); Cianfrone & Baker, supra note 130, at 52 (same); Gutmann,
supra note 25, at 219 (same). Although considered in many subsequent cases, no
court has applied the predominant use test since TCI Cablevision. Gutmann,
supra note 25, at 220. Jon Garon suggests that the case’s “factually specific
nature” explains its inconsistency with other opinions. Jon M. Garon, Playing in
the Virtual Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and Identity Reconceptualized Through
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Twist, a former National Hockey League (NHL) player, sued the
defendants after discovering that they had produced and sold a
comic book titled Spawn that featured an evil character named
Tony Twist.146 Twist was an “enforcer” whose primary role was to
fight opposing players and thereby protect his teammates.147 The
defendants admitted that they intentionally named the character
after the real Twist.148
After relabeling Twist’s case as a right of publicity claim, 149
the TCI Cablevision court explained the existing approaches,
including the Restatement’s relatedness test and the
transformative use test.150 The court rejected both alternatives,
reasoning that the tests accounted solely for expression and
thereby precluded a defendant’s commercial purposes.151 Instead,
the court adopted what it termed the predominant use test and
quoted Mark Lee’s original articulation of this test.152 Under the
Virtual Worlds and Computer Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 465, 505 (2008). He
argues that TCI Cablevision is “far less persuasive” than other opinions because
the comic book uses Twist’s name as a marketing ploy, unrelated to the comic
itself. Id. at 504.
146. See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 365–66 (describing the background
of Twist’s career, the teams he played for, how his career ended after a
motorcycle accident, and explaining the Tony Twist character’s role in the
Spawn comic).
147. See id. at 366 (explaining the role of an enforcer and Twist’s notorious
reputation for inflicting pain on his opponents).
148. See id. (noting that McFarlane, one of the founders of the company that
marketed and produced Spawn, admitted numerous times that the company
based the Tony Twist character on the real Twist and that the company would
continue to use hockey players’ names in comic books).
149. See id. at 368 (explaining that Twist filed a misappropriation action but
that a case like this that involves a celebrity seeking to recover money derived
by others from using his name is “more precisely labeled a right of publicity
action”).
150. See id. at 373 (explaining these tests and their origins).
151. See id. at 374 (“The weakness of [the two tests] is that they give too
little consideration to the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity
have both expressive and commercial components.”). The court elaborated:
“These tests operate to preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the name
and identity is in any way expressive, regardless of its commercial
exploitation. . . . Though these tests purport to balance the prospective interests
involved, there is no balancing at all—once the use is determined to be
expressive, it is protected.” Id.
152. See id. (asserting that the predominant use test “better addresses the
cases where speech is both expressive and commercial”); see also Mark S. Lee,
Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity–Free
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predominant use test, a product that “predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual’s identity” violates the right of
publicity whereas the First Amendment protects a product with
the “predominant purpose” of “mak[ing] an expressive comment
on or about a celebrity.”153 The court concluded that the comic
book’s predominant purpose was exploiting Twist’s identity and
thus held that the defendants violated Twist’s right of
publicity.154
B. Video Game Right of Publicity Cases
1. Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.155 is the first major video game
right of publicity case. The plaintiff, Kierin Kirby, was a singer,
dancer, and member of the musical group Deee-Lite, best known
for its hit “Groove is in the Heart.”156 Kirby sued Sega over its
production of the video game Space Channel 5, a futuristic
Japanese game involving aliens that invade Earth.157 After Sega’s
Japanese subsidiary contacted her about promoting a North
American version of the game, Kirby claimed that Space Channel
5’s main character, Ulala, looked and danced like Kirby.158
Nahoko Nezu, the dancer and choreographer who created Ulala’s
dance moves, maintained that the dance moves were her own and

Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003) (arguing that
whether a creative work violates a celebrity’s right of publicity depends on
“[w]hat is being exploited”).
153. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(internal quotations omitted).
154. See id. (finding that “Twist’s name has become predominantly a ploy to
sell comic books and related products rather than an artistic or literary
expression”).
155. 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
156. Id. at 50.
157. See id. at 51 (describing the game’s premise).
158. See id. at 52 (explaining that Kirby’s lawsuit followed the offer to use
Kirby and possibly “Groove is in the Heart” to promote a new version of the
game).
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that she had never heard of Kirby.159 Kirby alleged six causes of
action, including a right of publicity violation.160
The Kirby court noted that it was obliged to follow the
California Supreme Court’s transformative use test.161 The court
described how Comedy III formulated the test and explained both
the factors that Comedy III and Winter developed and how these
factors led to the two cases’ respective outcomes.162 The court
concluded that “Ulala [was] more than a mere likeness or literal
depiction of Kirby” and that Kirby’s right of publicity claim thus
failed under the transformative use test.163 It determined that
Sega added significant new expression to Kirby’s image and
rejected Kirby’s contention that the new expression must “say
something” about Kirby to receive First Amendment protection.164
The court focused on the many physical differences between
Ulala and Kirby165 and distinguished this case from Comedy III
because of the absence of a “literal depiction.”166
2. Romantics v. Activision Publishing, Inc.
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
decided Romantics v. Activision Publishing, Inc.167 in 2008 using
159. Id. at 51.
160. See id. at 53 (explaining that Kirby’s complaint included
misappropriation, Lanham Act, unfair competition, and other claims in addition
to the right of publicity claim).
161. See id. at 58–59, 61 (noting that the California Supreme Court had
adopted and applied this test in Comedy III and Winter and explaining that the
court was “bound to follow the decisions of [the California] Supreme Court, not
those of another state”).
162. See id. at 58–60 (clarifying that the Comedy III court designed the test
to balance a famous person’s right to control her identity with First Amendment
protections and noting that Winter clarified that the test’s “pivotal issue is
whether the work is transformative, not the form of literary expression”).
163. Id. at 59.
164. See id. at 60 (explaining that the differences between Kirby and Sega’s
new expression “are not trivial” and declining to add to the transformative use
test’s requirements).
165. See id. at 59 (noting that Ulala and Kirby “share similarities” but
focusing on differences in height, body build, hairstyle, fashion, and dancing
style).
166. Id. at 61.
167. 574 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Mich. 2008).
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the Rogers test.168 The current members of the rock band The
Romantics claimed that the publisher and distributor of the video
game Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s violated the members’
right of publicity.169 The game included The Romantics’ song
“What I Like About You.”170 The plaintiffs alleged that the song
in the game sounded so similar to the band’s original version that
the game would mislead consumers to believe that the plaintiffs
had “sponsored or endorsed” the video game.171 The nature of the
claim distinguishes this case from most other right of publicity
cases involving video games that traditionally deal with the
celebrities’ images rather than their sound.172
The court first observed that Michigan’s right of publicity did
not apply to the sound of a voice or a combination of voices.173 It
then explained that the First Amendment would protect the
defendants’ expression even if the plaintiffs had a right of
publicity over their voices.174 The court cited the Rogers test for
determining when the First Amendment shields “expressive
works” from right of publicity claims.175 The Sixth Circuit had
adopted the Rogers test in Parks v. LaFace Records,176 but its
respective district courts had not applied it in the video game

168. See id. at 765 (citing the Rogers test as the means of determining
whether the First Amendment outweighs one’s right of publicity).
169. See id. at 762 (explaining the relationship between the parties and the
plaintiffs’ claims).
170. See id. (describing the song’s popularity).
171. Id. at 762–63.
172. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that the athletes’
images are at issue); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018,
1022 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that the issue is whether the game
transforms the band members’ images).
173. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (E.D.
Mich. 2008) (explaining that a right of publicity exists in Michigan but declining
to extend the doctrine to a voice or voices “even if distinctive”).
174. See id. at 765 (agreeing with the defendants that even a “cognizable
claim” would be “preempted by the First Amendment”).
175. Id.
176. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447–50 (6th Cir. 2003)
(adopting the Rogers test after noting the other circuits that had adopted it and
after rejecting the “likelihood of confusion factors” and “alternative avenues
test”).
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context until Romantics.177 The Romantics court determined that
the game’s original content and a user’s choices in playing the
game rendered the game an expressive work and thus
necessitated applying the Rogers test.178 The court concluded that
the Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s survived the Rogers test
because the song was not wholly unrelated to the game’s content
and because the song was not a disguised commercial
advertisement for the game.179
3. No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc.
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc.180 is the most recent
right of publicity case involving a music group and a video game.
The famous rock band No Doubt181 sued Activision over
depictions of No Doubt in the video game Band Hero, a part of
Activision’s Guitar Hero series.182 No Doubt had licensed its
members’ likenesses to Activision for use in the game but argued
that Activision used the members’ likenesses in ways that

177. See id. at 450 (“Although the Rogers test has been criticized, we find it
the most appropriate method to balance the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion with the public interest in free expression.” (citation
omitted)).
178. See Romantics, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 766 (explaining that the game was
an expressive work because it “allows players to customize their game play
experience, contains large amounts of original artwork, and requires complex
synchronization so that the audio and visual elements of the [g]ame line up with
a player’s manipulation of the controller”).
179. See id. (applying the Rogers test and clarifying why the video game
passed the test). The court concluded, “Given that the purpose of the [g]ame is to
allow players to pretend they are in a rock band, the [s]ong is not wholly
unrelated to the content of the work. . . . [N]either the song nor [the p]laintiffs
are referenced in the [g]ame’s advertising, and it is possible to play the [g]ame
and never encounter the [s]ong. Thus, the [s]ong cannot be ‘a disguised
commercial advertisement.’” Id.
180. 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).
181. See id. at 1023 (calling No Doubt “internationally-recognized” and
noting that Gwen Stefani is the band’s lead singer).
182. See id. at 1022–23 (explaining No Doubt’s allegations and Activision’s
response); see also Marta Baffy, Note, Right of Publicity Licensing in a New Age:
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 362–
63 (2010) (describing Band Hero’s features and how the game fits into the
Guitar Hero series).
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violated the agreement.183 Band Hero featured avatars184 that
intentionally resembled the band members, but the game allowed
the members to sing other bands’ songs, to sing in the voices of
the opposite sex, and to perform without the full band.185 No
Doubt claimed that the agreement permitted Activision to use the
members’ likenesses “only in conjunction with the selected No
Doubt songs” and that it did not permit Activision to alter the
members’ avatars.186 No Doubt brought six claims, including a
right of publicity action.187
The trial court found for No Doubt, applying the
transformative use test and concluding that Activision did not
sufficiently transform the band members’ avatars.188 The
California Court of Appeal first explained the transformative use
test as articulated by Comedy III and as applied in Winter and
Kirby.189 It emphasized that the avatars clearly resembled the
band members.190 The court explained that surrounding the
183. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1023–24 (quoting the agreement’s
language and explaining No Doubt’s claims relating to features in the game that
No Doubt was not informed about).
184. See Jason Ross, Note, Licensing and Access Problems Producers of
Video Games Face in Foreign Markets: A Case Study, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 429, 429 n.2 (2012) (“An avatar is a computerized puppet controlled by
the human player that interacts within the virtual game world.”). This Note
uses “avatar” and “character” interchangeably.
185. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1024 (explaining No Doubt’s qualms
with these features of the game that the band claimed represented “additional
exploitation of their likeness”).
186. Id.; see also Baffy, supra note 182, at 365–68 (citing No Doubt’s
complaint and elaborating on the band’s basis for its allegations).
187. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1025 (summarizing No Doubt’s
claims including fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and injunctive relief
among others).
188. See id. (explaining the lower court’s application of the transformative
use test and noting the lower court’s finding that Activision may have also
contracted away certain First Amendment rights).
189. See id. at 1030–33 (describing the test and how the courts applied it in
these cases).
190. See id. at 1033 (noting that Activision admitted that the avatars were
“painstakingly designed to mimic [the No Doubt members’] likenesses”). The
court also focused on the lack of a feature that would allow users to alter the
characters: “The game does not permit players to alter the No Doubt avatars in
any respect; they remain at all times immutable images of the real celebrity
musicians, in stark contrast to the ‘fanciful, creative characters’ in Winter and
Kirby.” Id.

“GROOVE IS IN THE HART”

347

avatars with creative elements is not sufficient to pass the
transformative use test; instead, the game must transform the
celebrity’s image.191 It distinguished this case from Kirby by
explaining that Kirby involved a completely new character
performing acts distinct from the plaintiff’s acts, whereas the
avatars in Band Hero performed music just as the real No Doubt
members did.192 The court thus concluded that Activision violated
No Doubt’s right of publicity and affirmed the trial court’s
judgment.193
4. Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. and In re NCAA Student–Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation (Keller)
Hart and Keller are the two most recent right of publicity
decisions in the video game context.194 The cases’ facts are nearly
191. See id. at 1034 (explaining that the transformative use test requires
that an added element alter the celebrity’s likeness).
192. See id. (“In Kirby, the pop singer was portrayed by an entirely new
character—the space-age news reporter Ulala. In [this case], by contrast, . . . the
avatars perform rock songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and
maintains its fame.”); Blanke, supra note 24, at 52–53 (discussing the
differences between Kirby and No Doubt and concluding that the No Doubt court
found these differences to be “dispositive”).
193. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1034 (finding that Activision did not
add any new elements to the band members’ images and thus holding that
Activision’s First Amendment defense failed). Although the No Doubt court
writes as if this was a clear case, commentary prior to the decision viewed it as
much closer. See Baffy, supra note 182, at 382–83 (noting that No Doubt’s
outcome was “not clear” and explaining how Activision could have avoided the
suit by revealing the game’s features to the band).
194. Although they are the most recent decisions, former athletes are still
litigating the right of publicity as it relates to sports-themed video games. See
generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 09-CV-3329-CW (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 8, 2014). The O’Bannon plaintiffs, twenty current and former Division
I football players and athletes, originally brought a right of publicity claim
against Electronic Arts in addition to their antitrust and right of publicity
claims against the NCAA. See id. at *6 (explaining that the plaintiffs originally
sued both Electronic Arts and Collegiate Licensing Company). The plaintiffs
reached a settlement with Electronic Arts before the Northern District of
California decided O’Bannon. See id. (acknowledging the settlement). But
O’Bannon remains important for studying the right of publicity. The court
rejected the NCAA’s argument “that the First Amendment and certain state
laws preclude student-athletes from asserting any rights of publicity.” Id. at
*68. Finally, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Keller, rejected the
NCAA’s argument that the First Amendment exempts video game companies
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identical.195 Electronic Arts produced the NCAA Football video
game series.196 The games allow users to play with Division I
football teams composed of avatars that are accurate visual
representations of the team’s players in real life.197 The avatars’
talent levels also mimic those of the real college athletes.198 The
avatars are only one dimension of how each game mimics a real
college football environment,199 a feature that has facilitated the
series’s success.200
from having to acquire licenses to use “student-athletes’ names, images, and
likenesses.” Id. at *75 n.13. For a fuller analysis of O’Bannon and its
significance in both the right of publicity and antitrust contexts, see Marc
Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a
Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319 (2014).
195. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 163 (“[T]he only significant factual
difference between the two [cases] was the identity of the plaintiff.”).
196. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA
Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271
(9th Cir. 2013). Electronic Arts first produced the annual game in 1993, but the
company did not title the game NCAA Football until its 1997 version. Hart, 717
F.3d at 146. Electronic Arts chose not to release the game’s 2014 version
because of the litigation surrounding previous versions. Tom Risen, Electronic
Arts Cancels NCAA 2014 Video Game After Lawsuit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.
(Sept. 27, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/
09/27/electronic-arts-cancels-ncaa-2014-video-game-after-lawsuit (last visited
Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
197. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (noting the similarities between Hart’s avatar
and the athlete in real life, including number, height, weight, home state and
town, college team, and class year); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1272 (describing the
similarities between Keller and his avatar, including number, “height, weight,
skin tone, hair color, hair style, handedness, home state, play style (pocket
passer), visor preference, facial features, and school year”); Bahlert, supra note
24, at 150 (summarizing the similarities that Electronic Arts intentionally
replicates); Edelman, supra note 53, at 554–55 (“[I]n NCAA Football 12, the
avatar that represents University of Florida running back Chris Rainey
possesses Chris Rainey’s actual height, weight, skin complexion, and hair style.
In addition, both Chris Rainey and his virtual counterpart wear the same jersey
number, visor, gloves, and sweatbands.”).
198. See Edelman, supra note 53, at 568 (“Moreover, Electronic Arts does
not stop at simply copying the visual likeness of college athletes. NCAA Football
avatars also have specific ratings based on athleticism and tendencies of the
actual players they represent.”).
199. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (noting NCAA Football’s “focus on realism
and detail—from realistic sounds, to game mechanisms, to team mascots”);
Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271 (describing the game’s accurate representations of
stadiums, coaches, cheerleaders, fans, and noises).
200. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (explaining that the game’s success is due in
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The NCAA Football games have various game play modes,
differing with each year’s specific game.201 Examples include
“Dynasty Mode,” in which the user acts as a college team’s head
coach for up to thirty years, and “Campus Legend Mode,” in
which the user controls a single player for that player’s college
career.202 Unlike the game in No Doubt, which did not allow users
to alter the celebrities’ avatars,203 users of NCAA Football games
“can change the digital avatar’s appearance and most of the vital
statistics.”204
Hart brought a right of publicity action regarding the 2004,
2005, and 2006 NCAA Football games.205 The district court
granted summary judgment for Electronic Arts, and Hart
appealed.206 The Third Circuit began by noting that video games
qualify as speech under the First Amendment207 and explaining
that the court thus had to balance Hart’s right of publicity
against Electronic Arts’ First Amendment rights.208 The court
considered the predominant use test, the Rogers test, and the
transformative use test.209 After discussing TCI Cablevision, the
court rejected the predominant use test because of its subjective
nature.210 The court then declined to apply the Rogers test
large part to its reproduction of real life); Cianfrone & Baker, supra note 130, at
47 (noting that “EA prides itself on producing the most realistic college football
and basketball games on the market”).
201. See id. (describing the game’s typical single game format and the newer
more advanced “multi-game” modes).
202. See id. (describing the game modes in more detail); Keller, 724 F.3d at
1271–72 (same).
203. See supra note 190 (noting the lack of a transformative element in
Band Hero).
204. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2013).
205. Id. at 147.
206. See id. (explaining the case’s procedural posture and the district court’s
reasoning for granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment).
207. See supra note 93 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s recent Brown
decision expressly conferred First Amendment rights on video games).
208. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 148–49 (citing Brown and explaining the
balancing process).
209. See id. at 153 (explaining that these three tests “are of particular note”
among the balancing tests adopted since Zacchini).
210. See id. at 153–54 (explaining the test’s origin, its application in TCI
Cablevision, and the court’s reasons for rejecting it); infra note 306 and
accompanying text (highlighting just how little the Hart court thought of the
predominant use test).
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because it would effectively allow any video game company to use
a celebrity’s image in a game related to that celebrity’s area of
fame.211
The Hart court settled on the transformative use test based
on
its
“flexible—yet
uniformly
applicable—analytical
212
framework.” It described the test’s formation in Comedy III and
its application in Winter, Kirby, and No Doubt.213 In applying the
transformative use test, the Third Circuit first noted the
remarkable resemblance between Hart and his avatar in NCAA
Football.214 Although the court noted that the avatar was thus
“not transformative,” it explained that the game’s feature
allowing a user to alter players demanded further
consideration.215
The court clarified that the ability to alter avatars is not by
itself enough for a game to pass the transformative use test.216 If
it were, the court explained, producers like Electronic Arts could
completely appropriate a celebrity’s likeness and avoid liability

211. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2013)
(explaining that, under the Rogers test, Hart’s claim would fail simply because
he is a football player, and his likeness would accordingly not be “wholly
unrelated” to a football video game). The court also compared the right of
publicity to trademark law, noting that a “broader, more nuanced test” is needed
for video game right of publicity cases. Id. at 158.
212. Id. at 163. The court noted that it favored the transformative use test
over the Rogers test because the former “maintains a singular focus on whether
the work sufficiently transforms the celebrity’s likeness or identity.” Id. It
preferred the transformative use test over the predominant use test because the
latter does not sufficiently consider “whether [a video game] was merely created
to exploit a celebrity’s likeness.” Id. Finally, the court explained that “the
[t]ransformative [u]se [t]est is most consistent with other courts’ ad hoc
approaches to right of publicity cases.” Id. at 164.
213. See id. at 158–63 (explaining how the courts articulated and applied
the test in each of these cases).
214. See id. at 166 (noting similarities in physical appearance, clothing
accessories, biographical information, and activity (i.e., playing football)).
215. See id. at 166–67 (explaining that the “ability to alter the avatar’s
appearance” prohibited the court from quickly ruling for Hart based on the lack
of a transformative element). The court distinguished this case from No Doubt
by explaining that there is even less “transformative content” in NCAA Football
than in Band Hero and by noting that Band Hero lacks an option to alter
avatars. Id. at 166.
216. See id. at 167 (noting that changeability is not “sufficient to surmount
the already-existing First Amendment protections”).
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simply by adding such a feature.217 The court emphasized that
Hart’s avatar was the “default position” and that any
transformation was “predicated on the users’ desire to alter the
avatar’s appearance.”218 It further reasoned that minor
alterations to the player’s information and accessories were
insufficient transformations219 and that more major alterations,
like those of the player’s physical body, were not transformations
of Hart’s likeness at all, but rather the user’s creation of a new
player.220 The Third Circuit thus reversed the district court’s
judgment and held that the NCAA Football games did not
transform Hart’s likeness and that Electronic Arts violated Hart’s
right of publicity.221
Unlike Hart, Keller was a class action lawsuit against
Electronic Arts.222 The district court in Keller concluded that
Electronic Arts lacked a First Amendment defense and
accordingly held for the former college athletes.223 Electronic Arts
appealed, asserting both the transformative use test and the
Rogers test as affirmative defenses.224 The Ninth Circuit first
discussed the transformative use test as formulated in Comedy
217. See id. (summarizing the policy considerations against allowing video
game companies this easy way around the right of publicity).
218. Id. at 168.
219. See id. (“The ability to make minor alterations—which substantially
maintain the avatar’s resemblance to [Hart] . . . is likewise insufficient, for ‘[a]n
artist depicting a celebrity must contribute something more than a merely
trivial variation.’” (quoting Winter v. D.C. Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 478–79 (Cal.
2003))). But see Garon, supra note 145, at 504 (arguing that the precedent prior
to Hart indicated that a user’s ability to “manipulate the names and likeness to
create new characters, cast those characters into a variety of sports, enhance the
play of the characters, and evolve the people in a wide variety of ways” was
sufficiently transformative).
220. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2013)
(explaining that Hart’s likeness would no longer exist after these larger
changes).
221. See id. at 170 (summarizing the transformative use test analysis).
222. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.
(Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1272 (9th Cir. 2013).
223. See id. at 1271 (discussing the case’s procedural history); Blanke, supra
note 24, at 53 (explaining that the contradictory district court judgments in
Hart and Keller are a major difference between the cases); Bucher, supra note
26, at 19 (same).
224. See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1273 (explaining that the issue on appeal was
whether one of Electronic Arts’ affirmative defenses applied).
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III and as applied in Winter, Kirby, and No Doubt.225 The court
accepted this as the correct test based on the court’s obligation to
follow state law and the existing California precedent for the
transformative use test in the video game context.226 It noted that
No Doubt “provide[d] persuasive guidance” and analogized NCAA
Football’s features to those of Band Hero.227 The court
emphasized that both this case and No Doubt lack transformed or
completely new characters like those in Kirby.228 The Keller court
also cited Hart as persuasive precedent in its transformative use
analysis.229
The Ninth Circuit rejected Electronic Arts’ Rogers test
defense.230 It reasoned that the Rogers test protects consumers
whereas the right of publicity protects celebrities.231 Because the
plaintiffs’ claims related to celebrities, the Rogers test could not
achieve the necessary balancing.232 It also explained that the
Rogers test is not well accepted in the right of publicity arena.233
The court thus affirmed the district court’s judgment.234
The dissenting opinions in both Hart and Keller agree with
their respective majorities that the transformative use test is the
proper balancing approach but insist that the majority opinions
applied this test incorrectly.235 Both dissents contend that the
225. See id. at 1273–75 (describing the test’s factors and its application in
video game and non-video game California cases).
226. See id. at 1278 (noting that the court was bound to rule as it believed
the California Supreme Court would).
227. See id. at 1277–78 (discussing the similarities between this case and No
Doubt, including realistic settings, avatars doing what their respective
celebrities do in real life, and avatars that look like the celebrities).
228. See id. at 1277 (distinguishing the “realistically portrayed” celebrities
in this case and No Doubt from the fantastical character Ulala in Kirby).
229. See id. at 1278 (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion aligned with
that of the Third Circuit in Hart).
230. See id. at 1280 (explaining that the court’s rejection of the Rogers test is
consistent with Hart).
231. Id. at 1280–81.
232. See id. at 1281 (describing the plaintiffs’ arguments and concluding
that the Rogers test “is simply not responsive to Keller’s asserted interests”).
233. See id. at 1281–82 (explaining that the only circuit to use the Rogers
test in a right of publicity case was the Sixth Circuit in Parks but that the Sixth
Circuit later declined to apply the test in another right of publicity decision).
234. Id. at 1284.
235. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 171 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J.,
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proper inquiry is whether the video game as a whole—not an
individual avatar—is transformative.236 The opinions identify the
many creative and transformative elements elsewhere in the
NCAA Football games.237 The dissenting judges also distinguish
these cases from prior right of publicity cases in the video game
context by noting the NCAA Football games’ high number of
avatars,238 use of “publicly available data,”239 and ability for users
to alter avatars.240
IV. Scholars’ Suggested Alternatives to Current Tests
Scholars recognize that multiple, inconsistently applied tests
create major problems.241 They have suggested numerous
alternatives for remedying issues with the right of publicity as a
whole.242 Two scholars have proposed new tests specifically for
the video game context, although no court deciding a major case
has seriously considered either of them.243
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority opinion’s “interpretation and
application” of the transformative use test); In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name
& Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the transformative use test’s balancing
favors Electronic Arts’ First Amendment freedoms).
236. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 171 (“I believe it is necessary to review the
likeness in the context of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing on the
individual’s likeness.”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (asserting the need to evaluate
the game as a whole).
237. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (describing the game series’s creative
elements including “original graphics, videos, sound effects, and game
scenarios”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271–72 (identifying creative elements such as
the ability to create new players and the multiple game modes).
238. See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1287 (contrasting the high number of football
players in the NCAA Football games to the relatively low number of band
members in No Doubt’s Band Hero).
239. Id. at 1288.
240. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (arguing that the ability to alter avatars
“furthers the game’s transformative interactivity”).
241. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (explaining that scholars
are aware of the need for uniform application of a single test).
242. See, e.g., Adkins, supra note 82, at 502 (advocating for a “Uniform Right
of Publicity Act”); Smedley, supra note 85, at 471–72 (proposing a new spin on
the transformative use test to remedy inconsistencies in right of publicity cases
generally).
243. See supra Part III.B (explaining the tests that courts have used and
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Brittany Adkins suggests a uniform right of publicity act that
would govern the right of publicity as a whole.244 Adkins
articulates four benefits of a uniform act that would apply in the
right of publicity arena: (1) enabling businesses to operate
interstate, (2) simplifying the law for individuals who frequently
travel between states, (3) cutting the costs of doing business
through “simplif[ied] transactions,” and (4) reducing forum
shopping.245 Adkins’s uniform act would include “an expansive
scope of rights” that are “both freely assignable and freely
descendible” and would include provisions on the available
remedies.246 Although her suggestion has substantial merit,247 it
ignores the significance of the substantial variation among the
laws enacted by various states.248 The states that recognize a
right of publicity have defined this right according to their policy
decisions, making it unlikely that these states will choose to
abandon their traditional laws for a new act that combines
snippets of various states’ laws.249
Other scholars advocate for a federal right of publicity. 250
Alex Wyman argues that “the need for consistent federal
treatment of [the right of publicity] is more urgent than ever

considered in right of publicity cases in the video game context).
244. See Adkins, supra note 82, at 502 (asserting that the “confused and
convoluted litigation” spawning from the current state-specific system mandates
a uniform act).
245. Id. at 525.
246. Id. at 530, 534, 542. Although these are the primary features of
Adkins’s suggestion, the proposal includes numerous specific provisions,
definitions, and intricacies that Adkins borrows from the California, Indiana,
and Tennessee right of publicity statutes. See id. at 528–45 (explaining precisely
what Adkins’s uniform act would include and the importance of each provision).
247. See id. at 527 (explaining that a uniform act would offer “protection of
federalism, . . . conservation of state legislative resources, . . . and the benefit of
learning from the experience of other states”).
248. See supra Part II.D (describing the differences among a small sampling
of state right of publicity statutes).
249. See Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the
Judicial Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811, 854–55 (1991)
(noting the importance of public policy in the creation of state law and warning
federal courts against forcing policy decisions on states).
250. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 154 (explaining that the right of
publicity’s variation among states “has led many to call for a federal right of
publicity statute”).
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before.”251 Susannah Rooney suggests using the Lanham Act,252
which governs federal trademark law, to administer the right of
publicity.253 She argues that Congress has authority to regulate
the right of publicity under the Commerce Clause and that it
would be a “logical step” for the federal government to
standardize the right of publicity because it already regulates
other intellectual property rights.254 Rooney proposes that the
Lanham Act approach would have three major benefits, similar to
those envisioned by Adkins.255 She believes her proposal would
reduce forum shopping,256 carve back some states’ expansive laws
that protect “minute elements of a person’s identity,”257 and
better protect First Amendment rights.258 Wyman expressly
rejects Rooney’s suggestion, reasoning instead that the Lanham
Act would be an “inadequate federal approach” for evaluating the
right of publicity.259
Sean Whaley also advocates for a federal right of publicity,
albeit not specifically under the Lanham Act as Rooney

251. Wyman, supra note 25, at 173. He asserts that “we need a federal right
of publicity not just to clarify the mess of laws on the subject, but also to
restrain the right to prevent it from impinging on our constitutional rights any
further.” Id. at 175.
252. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1114n (2012); see Rebecca Tushnet, Running the
Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 1305, 1309–13 (2011) (describing the history behind false advertising
claims under the Lanham Act).
253. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 924 (proposing that this change is
necessary in light of new technology and inconsistent and unpredictable
application of state laws).
254. See id. at 945–46 (explaining the expansive scope of Congress’s
Commerce Clause power and describing the similarities between the right of
publicity and copyright, patent, and trademark law).
255. See id. at 924 (introducing these benefits as the principle reasons for
regulating the right of publicity under the Lanham Act).
256. See id. at 934 (explaining that inconsistent domicile rules in states’
right of publicity laws leave forum shopping “uncorrected”).
257. Id. at 924.
258. See id. at 944 (contending that Rooney’s suggestion would allow
Congress to protect the First Amendment by limiting the right of publicity).
259. See Wyman, supra note 25, at 171. Wyman rejects using the Lanham
Act to evaluate right of publicity claims because many federal courts of appeals
have already rejected using it and because the right of publicity and the
Lanham Act “address very distinct problems.” Id. at 171–72.
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suggests.260 Like Rooney, however, Whaley recognizes that the
federal government currently regulates other intellectual
property rights.261 Whaley also asserts that a federal right of
publicity would advance both the right of publicity’s economic
incentive to make a name for oneself and the moral right to
develop one’s identity.262 Finally, he argues that federal
regulation would reduce administrative costs and forum
shopping.263
Although their policy considerations are laudable, Rooney’s
and Whaley’s suggested alternatives are flawed for two reasons.
First, the right of publicity needs to remain with states because
many individuals are well-known in some states but not in other
states.264 A federal test would not account for different levels of
familiarity to the same degree that the readily identifiable
standard will.265
Second, a federal right of publicity would encroach on state
sovereignty.266 Under states’ police powers, each state has the
authority to regulate the morality of its citizens.267 Even Whaley
concedes that moral rights are “an important foundation of
260. See Whaley, supra note 70, at 259–60 (introducing Whaley’s proposed
federal right of publicity).
261. See id. at 260 (explaining that the right of publicity, like the federally
regulated trademark and unfair competition laws, “protect[s] the value of
certain intangible property used in commerce”).
262. See id. at 261–65 (discussing economic and moral justifications for a
federal right of publicity).
263. See id. at 266–67 (articulating the public policy advantages of a federal
right of publicity).
264. See infra note 372 and accompanying text (introducing the concept of
“regionally known personas”).
265. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 950–55 (explaining the specifics of
Rooney’s proposal, which does not account for differing levels of familiarity with
the celebrity); infra note 332 and accompanying text (explaining that the readily
identifiable standard applies from the perspective of someone familiar with the
individual in question).
266. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012)
(explaining that the framers crafted state sovereignty, an essential element of a
federalist system, to ensure that “the facets of governing that touch on citizens’
daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the
governed”).
267. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (explaining that morality,
along with public health and safety and other areas of regulation, fall within
states’ traditional police powers).
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publicity rights.”268 The right of publicity is a moral right because
a company can violate it by using a celebrity’s likeness in
conjunction with a product that the celebrity views as morally
objectionable.269 Alternatively, a person may morally object to any
appropriation of her likeness.270 A federal right of publicity would
place the power to regulate this moral right with the federal
government and thereby violate a foundational principle of the
United States’ federalist system.271 Nineteen states do not
recognize the right of publicity under either a statute or the
common law.272 A federal right of publicity law would force a
moral law on these states that their democratically elected state
legislatures have declined to adopt themselves.273
Joseph Gutmann has suggested an alternative to existing
tests for the video game context.274 Using the lower court Hart
and Keller opinions as a springboard, Gutmann advocates for a
“redefined transformative test” that will be “simpler and better
equipped to deal with . . . increased litigation” in the booming
video game industry.275 The core of the redefined transformative
268. Whaley, supra note 70, at 271. Admittedly, Rooney disagrees. She
argues that the elements of an individual’s “commercial value,” which the right
of publicity protects, do not “fit[] neatly into an inherent moral right.” Rooney,
supra note 27, at 927.
269. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 122–23 (explaining the multiple forms of
moral objections that the right of publicity guards against).
270. See id. at 123 (listing examples of this type of general moral objection).
271. See Usha Rodrigues, Note, Race to the Stars: A Federalism Argument
for Leaving the Right of Publicity in the Hands of the States, 87 VA. L. REV. 1201,
1211 (2001) (noting the “elementary proposition” that the right of publicity falls
under the rights governed by state law in a federalist society).
272. See supra notes 83–84 (listing the nineteen states that have right of
publicity statutes and the twelve that recognize the right under common law).
273. See Rodrigues, supra note 271, at 1212 (arguing that a federal right of
publicity would be “premature” until states reach more of a consensus on how
much protection a right of publicity should confer). Rodrigues warns that
adopting a federal right of publicity at this stage of the right’s development
could result in “a model of persona protection that might cement into an
unwieldy and oppressive regime.” Id. at 1227.
274. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 217 (introducing his test and the need
for it).
275. Id. at 227. Gutmann emphasizes the increasing popularity of video
games within unexpected demographics. He cites a 2011 study that provides
that video and computer games are played in 72% of American households, that
29% of video game players are over 50, and that 33% of video game players
report gaming as their favorite computer activity. Id. at 226–27.
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test is distinguishing video games that place characters in an
“altered reality” from those that feature avatars in an “imitation
of life.”276 A video game is in the altered reality category and is
thus transformative “[e]ven if the likeness has similarities to an
actual person, as long as the intention is for the likeness’[s] path
in the game to be open to different scenarios from the ones
present in the person’s life.”277 Gutmann cites Kirby as the
“baseline” case in this category.278
A game is an imitation of life and thus not sufficiently
transformative if “the likeness’s intended path in the
game . . . match[es] the path taken by the actual person in his or
her life.”279 Gutmann extensively describes what factors courts
should consider in making the classification, including the video
game character’s environment and the “changeability” of
avatars.280 He reasons that the changeability feature in Hart and
Keller weighs toward altered reality classification, but concludes
that the clear similarities between the games and reality put the
NCAA Football games in the imitation of life category.281
Gutmann’s work is commendable for its attempt to establish
a standard that, if adopted, would help video game companies
predict the outcome of litigation and would help courts reach
consistent results.282 Gutmann’s suggestion also takes a step in
the right direction by ignoring interactivity in determining
276. Id. at 227.
277. Id. at 228.
278. See id. at 229 (explaining that Kirby fits within the altered reality
category because Ulala “was given a new environment, new characteristics[,]
and a new profession”).
279. Id. at 231. Gutmann argues that no major case involves a clear
imitation of life video game. Id. at 233. He asserts, however, that Hilton v.
Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2009), is a good non-video game
illustration because it considered a greeting card that featured a photo of Paris
Hilton doing exactly what she did on her television show The Simple Life. Id.
280. See id. at 228–38 (describing the altered reality and imitation of life
categories in detail and using No Doubt to demonstrate how courts should apply
the redefined transformative test).
281. See id. at 230–31 (evaluating the classification of Hart and Keller under
the redefined transformative test).
282. See id. at 248 (explaining that Gutmann intended to resolve
inconsistent opinions by creating a test that is “fair, easily applicable, and
faithful to the ideas upon which [Comedy III’s transformative use test] was
based”).
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whether a video game violates the right of publicity.283 But his
redefined transformative test has several serious flaws. First, the
test’s changeability suggestion evades logic. Gutmann asserts
that the user’s ability to alter characters makes a game
transformative, but the Third Circuit observed in Hart that this
feature, standing alone, cannot give a video game First
Amendment protection.284 Instead, courts must evaluate video
games in their default form.285 Second, the redefined
transformative test’s use of a video game producer’s intent as an
“integral piece”286 would be difficult to prove and thus contradicts
Gutmann’s purpose of simplifying litigation.287 Third, it is
possible to have a single game that has various game modes,
some of which qualify as altered reality and others of which
qualify as imitation of life.288 For example, the Hart and Keller
courts noted that the NCAA Football games include the primary
single game mode as well as a dynasty mode in which the user
acts as a team’s coach.289 Gutmann would classify the former
game mode as an imitation of life but the latter as an altered
283. See id. at 228 (explaining that the redefined transformative test would
not consider interactivity). Gutmann’s reasoning on this point is straightforward
and logical: “The fact that a user can control a character is not relevant, because
control alone does not make any change to the work. It is the way that the
character can be used, and whether such manner of use diverts from reality,
that is key.” Id.
284. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (explaining that
transformative elements beyond changeability are necessary to pass the
transformative use test).
285. See infra Part V.B (explaining that evaluation in the default form is
necessary to avoid giving video game companies an easy route around right of
publicity liability).
286. Gutmann, supra note 25, at 235.
287. See D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing
Discriminatory Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L.
REV. 733, 773–75 (1987) (outlining why it is so difficult for courts to determine
intent).
288. See Mary Catherine Moore, Note, There is No “I” in NCAA: Why College
Sports Video Games Do Not Violate College Athletes’ Rights of Publicity Such to
Entitle Them to Compensation for Use of Their Likenesses, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
269, 289 (2010) (recognizing the mix of realistic and fantasy game modes in
video games).
289. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 175 (3d Cir. 2013) (outlining
the various game modes); In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271–72 (9th Cir. 2013) (same).
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reality.290 His redefined transformative test does not address how
courts should categorize such games.291
Finally, Charles Bahlert has proposed the “reality-mimicking
predominant use test,” which is essentially a hybrid of the
transformative use and predominant use tests.292 Bahlert’s test
would instruct courts to consider six factors in evaluating video
games:
(1) The purpose and character of the use; (2) [e]vidence of
intent; (3) [w]hether the use contains the actual name or
likeness of the person versus more generalized indicia of
identity; (4) [e]xtent of appropriation; (5) [e]xtent to which the
person is distinctive or famous; [and] (6) [the d]efendant's
prior dealings in same or similar circumstances. 293

Bahlert argues that considering intent is necessary to protect the
right of publicity’s policy justifications.294 But, as explained
below, considering intent is extremely subjective.295 Bahlert’s
Brennan-like
pragmatic
approach
thus
muddies
the
transformative use test’s waters.
V. A Better Alternative: The Readily Identifiable Standard
This Part addresses the need for a workable solution by
proposing the readily identifiable standard. Subpart A explains
what an effective test must do, in part by highlighting the three
existing tests’ flaws. Subpart B outlines in detail the specifics of
the readily identifiable standard, including which of a game’s
elements the test will and will not consider. Subpart B also
explains how the new test aligns with public policy and how it
290. See supra notes 277–279 and accompanying text (defining the imitation
of life and altered reality categories).
291. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 227 (explaining that Gutmann’s test is
a “[m]ethod of delineation” that depends on a clear classification for each video
game).
292. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 166 (explaining that Bahlert’s test
“expand[s] the [t]ransformative [u]se [t]est to include a defendant's underlying
purpose in using a person's likeness”).
293. Id. at 167.
294. See id. (discussing these justifications).
295. See infra notes 359–364 and accompanying text (explaining why the
readily identifiable standard will ignore a video game producer’s intent).
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differs from the transformative use test. Subpart C applies the
readily identifiable standard to the cases discussed in Part III.B.
A. Goals in Crafting a New Test
It is easiest to illustrate what an effective test for analyzing
right of publicity claims in the video game context must do by
first examining and rehashing why the existing alternatives are
problematic.296 The three existing alternatives all include aspects
of what the proper test needs to do but each unfortunately lacks
other necessary traits.297
The Rogers test, as applied in the video game context, has
several defects. First, the Second Circuit designed it to apply
specifically to celebrities’ names in titles, not to video games or
even to celebrities’ images.298 This Note does not intend to imply
that courts should not apply the Rogers test outside of the movie
title context. Courts have admittedly applied the test consistently
and sensibly in Lanham Act claims.299 But the Third Circuit
noted in Hart that the significant differences between the right of
publicity and trademark law necessitate a different test for
each.300 Second, the Rogers test is inappropriate for the right of
publicity in the video game context because most video game
cases involve a celebrity’s image.301 It is much harder for a court
296. See ALEXANDER LOWEN, BIOENERGETICS 30 (1994) (“No one is exempt
from the rule that learning occurs through recognition of error.”).
297. See, e.g., Garon, supra note 145, at 505–06 (arguing that “[t]he Missouri
predominant use test goes too far in requiring a direct reference to the
particular celebrity as a prerequisite to protecting free expression interests”
while “California[’s transformative use test] goes too far in excluding the market
effect from publicity fair use analysis”).
298. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining that the Second
Circuit limited its holding in Rogers to movie titles).
299. See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 2013)
(explaining that the Rogers test is appropriate for evaluating Lanham Act
claims because it properly evaluates artistic relevance); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc.
v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (same).
300. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
right of publicity is broader [than trademark protections] and, by extension,
protects a greater swath of property interests. Thus, it would be unwise for us to
adopt a test that hews so closely to traditional trademark principles.”).
301. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining that the claims
in all of Part III.B’s cases other than Romantics related to depictions of the
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to determine whether a celebrity’s image is wholly unrelated to a
video game’s content than it is to decide whether there is a
sufficient link between a movie’s title and content.302 Third, the
test “does not adequately account for the right’s strong policy
rationales of rewarding moral rights and labor and preventing
unjust enrichment” because it “favor[s] the First Amendment
over the right of publicity in nearly every expressive scenario.”303
Finally, it “fails to account for evidence of bad faith to
commercially exploit a persona.”304
The predominant use test’s fatal flaw is its inherently
subjective nature.305 The Hart court accurately concluded that the
test is “subjective at best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case
calls upon judges to act as both impartial jurists and discerning
art critics.”306 The predominant use test also gives too much
weight to the First Amendment. A video game company is
unlikely to appropriate an individual’s likeness for the sheer
purpose of doing so; rather, a company would do so for financial
gain.307 But the predominant use test will protect all video games
celebrities’ images).
302. See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 10:31 (4th ed. 1996) (asserting that the Rogers test is even inappropriate for
the movie title context because it requires courts to make subjective judgments).
303. Bahlert, supra note 24, at 158. Bahlert acknowledges that the Rogers
test succeeds at being a “bright-line test,” but he criticizes its “extremely low
requirements.” Id. Gutmann suggests that this shortcoming makes the Rogers
test “unfaithful to the original principles of the right of publicity.” Gutmann,
supra note 25, at 220.
304. Bahlert, supra note 24, at 158.
305. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 221 (explaining that the predominant
use test is not a viable alternative because it “does not provide any guidance for
determining what ‘predominant’ means”); Simcox, supra note 101, at 106–07
(criticizing the subjective inquiry that the predominant use test requires and
arguing that such analysis is especially dangerous “in cases involving the
determination of the aesthetic or creative merit of expression”); Smedley, supra
note 85, at 464 (noting that “recent courts have rejected [the predominant use
test] on the basis that its results are too subjective and focus too much on the
intended use of the celebrity's likeness rather than focusing on the work itself”);
Recent Case, supra note 75, at 1218–19 (arguing that applying the predominant
use test “inescapably requires judges to engage in the dubious task of making
aesthetic judgments about creative works”).
306. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013).
307. See Pamela Lynn Kunath, Note and Comment, Lights, Camera,
Animate! The Right of Publicity’s Effect on Computer-Animated Celebrities, 29
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 886–87 (1996) (explaining that appropriation of a
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without that main intention, regardless of whether the game has
an incidental effect of commercial exploitation.308
The transformative use test is the most workable of the three
tests, in large part because it can be summarized in a single
sentence.309 Like the predominant use test, however, the
transformative use test is “vague and unpredictable, as it
depends wholly on whether the judge deems a work of art to have
sufficient ‘creative contribution.’”310 In other words, the test is
subjective and difficult to apply consistently as the contradicting
district court rulings in Hart and Keller highlight.311 The
inconsistencies promise to become more frequent as video game
technology advances because this innovation will force more
courts to select and apply a test.312
The transformative use test also disregards “commercial
components” and instead considers solely expression.313 This
approach creates two problems. First, as the TCI Cablevision
court explained, ignoring commercial aspects allows a video game
producer to avoid liability for intentionally appropriating a

celebrity’s likeness is motivated by commercial purposes).
308. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 221 n.47 (insisting that this permissive
standard contradicts Zacchini’s “fundamental protective principle” that a
famous person has a right to protect the fruits of his labor). Bahlert suggests
that the “[t]est’s focus on a defendant's commercial purpose is arguably
‘dangerous.’” Bahlert, supra note 24, at 160.
309. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799
(Cal. 2001) (describing the transformative use test as “essentially a balancing
test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether
the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation”).
310. Wyman, supra note 25, at 174. Wyman goes on to explain that “instead
of helping define the First Amendment’s boundaries, this recent and increasing
application of the transformative use test only blurs the lines.” Id. at 175.
311. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 165 (“Due in part to its subjectivity, the
[t]ransformative [u]se [t]est inevitably leads to unpredictable results. The
district court holdings in Keller and Hart support this phenomenon. Two judges,
examining virtually identical facts, reached opposite conclusions.”); supra note
26 (explaining that these distinct outcomes necessitate a more workable test).
312. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 222 (“[Some cases] present significant
problems when it comes to interpreting the [transformative use] test in light of
this relatively new technology. . . . As the technology advances, issues . . . will
only increase and the murky zone of video games will only get murkier.”).
313. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc).
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celebrity’s likeness.314 Second, “[f]ocusing on expression forces
judges to make subjective decisions, which means the application
of the test results in conflicting and unpredictable outcomes.”315
Accordingly, Kyle Simcox argues that the transformative use test
is “outdated” because it “fails to recognize the modern realities of
video games.”316 He reasons that the process of creating video
games is inherently creative, and a test that considers whether a
game sufficiently transforms individuals’ likenesses is thus
unusable.317
A workable test needs to include considerations and
components that correct the current tests’ imperfections. First,
the test must apply specifically to the video game context.318
Proper balancing of the right of publicity and the First
Amendment depends on the specific medium that allegedly
violates an individual’s right of publicity.319 The same test is thus
not appropriate for evaluating a right of publicity claim based on
a celebrity’s image in electronic entertainment and a right of
publicity claim based on a movie or book title.320 This necessarily
314. See id. (rejecting the transformative use test for this reason); accord
Garon, supra note 145, at 500 (arguing that the transformative use test “may
allow for much greater exploitation of an actor or athlete’s identity than ha[s]
been historically permitted” because the test “does not take the commercial
nature of the use into account”).
315. Bahlert, supra note 24, at 151.
316. Simcox, supra note 101, at 119.
317. See id. (describing the transformative process of video game creation
that companies design to give users a fantasy experience).
318. See Erika T. Olander, Comment, Stop the Presses! First Amendment
Limitations of Professional Athletes’ Publicity Rights, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
885, 898 (2002) (asserting that whether the First Amendment protects
commercial use of a celebrity’s identity is “context-specific”).
319. See Bucher, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]hough the balancing of right of
publicity and First Amendment interests may seem straightforward to some,
the context in which an individual claims that his right of publicity has been
infringed changes the analysis.”); Wyman, supra note 25, at 174 (arguing that
“these cases exponentially increase the chances that filmmakers, videogame
creators, biographers, journalists and others will choose to censor themselves
rather than risk liability from the nebulous right of publicity laws” and that
“this self-censorship . . . is causing the right of publicity to infringe on First
Amendment rights”).
320. See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1015–16 (3d Cir.
2008) (declining to apply the Rogers test to a right of publicity claim about a
video game’s promotional video because the other circuits had applied it only in
the context of book and movie titles, other than once regarding a book cover and
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eliminates the possibility of adopting a test from another context
as the Romantics and TCI Cablevision courts did.321
Second, an effective standard must be capable of consistent
application.322 A body of cases that consistently apply the same
test will establish expectations that video game companies can
rely on in creating new games.323 If companies have a better idea
of when a game will violate someone’s right of publicity, logic
dictates that the companies will not cross that line.324 As a result,
fewer video games will violate celebrities’ rights of publicity, and
litigation will decrease.
Third, the test must account for consumer expectations only
to the degree necessary in the video game context and thus allot
the appropriate amount of First Amendment protection.325 There
is a high risk of consumer confusion in video games.326 The
“commercialized nature of celebrity endorsements” is responsible
for this frequent confusion.327 But, as Jon Garon observes, the
possibility of consumer confusion provides little incentive to
reduce video game producers’ First Amendment rights because
“audiences are not harmed by the confusion” in video games.328
once regarding a painting). In the case Facenda references in which the Sixth
Circuit adopted the Rogers test to evaluate a painting, the dissent notably
argued that the majority should not have applied the Rogers test because
previous courts limited their holdings to the context of titles. ETW Corp. v. Jireh
Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 944 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., dissenting).
321. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 768–69
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (adopting the Rogers test in the video game context for the
first time); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(borrowing the predominant use test from an article by Mark Lee).
322. See Andreas N. Andrews, Note and Comment, Stop Copying Me:
Rethinking Rights of Publicity Verses the First Amendment, 32 TEMP. J. SCI.
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 127, 129 (2013) (arguing that a single test is needed for
“consistency and efficiency”).
323. See id. (insisting that a single test is needed to allow “video game
companies . . . [to] tailor their artistic creations around a consistent application
of the law”).
324. See Theodore C. Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis,
Tort Liability and the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471, 480 (1990)
(noting that “[t]he essence of deterrence is predictability”).
325. See Blanke, supra note 24, at 35, 44, 55–56 (illustrating the controversy
surrounding video games’ First Amendment rights).
326. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (identifying this risk).
327. Garon, supra note 145, at 498.
328. Id.
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Whereas a consumer is likely to buy or use a book, movie, or
video game based on its name, a video game user will usually
decide to play a game before ever seeing what its characters look
like.329 Consumer confusion is thus less important in the context
of a video game’s avatars than in the context of a title or a similar
circumstance in which a consumer decides to buy or use a product
based on appropriation of a celebrity’s likeness. Video game
avatars should thus receive more First Amendment protection
than the titles and similar external components of a work.330
B. The Readily Identifiable Standard Explained
This Note contends that a different test could better address
these goals. By both necessity and design, the readily identifiable
standard can be simplified in a single sentence:331 A video game
violates an individual’s right of publicity if a person familiar with
the individual would look at a video game character and know
immediately that the character is definitively based on the real
individual.332 Conversely, a video game deserves First
Amendment protection if the individual’s likeness is not both
immediately and definitively obvious. Although most right of
publicity cases in the video game context deal with a celebrity’s
image,333 the readily identifiable standard can also apply to a
video game’s other elements. For example, a video game will

329. See id. (explaining that consumer confusion in video games does not
affect users’ choice to buy or play the game because “[t]he audience member’s
choice to read, watch, or play has already been made”).
330. See id. (arguing that there should be an inverse relationship between
the importance of consumer confusion and the amount of First Amendment
deference given to creative works); see also Edelman, supra note 53, at 586
(arguing that “courts must recognize that the scales of justice point in favor of
protecting college athletes’ publicity rights in commercial video games”).
331. See supra note 309 and accompanying text (noting the importance of
simplicity in a test).
332. See infra note 340 and accompanying text (explaining that some courts
have already been evaluating right of publicity claims from the perspective of
someone familiar with the plaintiff).
333. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting that Romantics is an
exception to this trend because it involves a right of publicity claim relating to
sound).
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violate a celebrity’s right of publicity if the celebrity’s song is
immediately and definitively recognizable in the game.
The readily identifiable standard borrows the term “readily
identifiable” from Motschenbacher, which used the phrase in
describing how the plaintiff customized his race cars.334 But the
real source of the test is Judge Alarcon’s dissent in White.335
Although he does not use the words “readily identifiable,” Judge
Alarcon discusses both Motschenbacher and Carson at length and
effectively applies the readily identifiable standard.336 He
ultimately concludes, “It is patently clear to anyone viewing the
commercial advertisement that Vanna White was not being
depicted. No reasonable juror could confuse a metal robot with
Vanna White.”337 Because it is not immediately and definitively
clear that the advertisement is based on White’s image—
particularly because the figure is a robot in the advertisement
and because there are distinct differences between the picture’s
background and the Wheel of Fortune game set338—Judge
334. See Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822
(9th Cir. 1974) (describing how the plaintiff used a “distinctive narrow white
pinstripe” to make his cars “more readily identifiable”). The Sixth Circuit quoted
the phrase in a discussion of Motschenbacher nearly a decade later. See Carson
v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 844 (6th Cir. 1983)
(discussing Motschenbacher in determining whether a portable toilets company
violated an entertainer’s right of publicity through use of his nickname in the
corporation’s name).
335. See supra notes 125–127 (discussing Judge Alarcon’s dissent and his
reasoning).
336. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1403–04 (9th
Cir. 1992) (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (noting that there were many more
similarities between the images and celebrities in Motschenbacher and Carson
than in White).
337. Id. at 1404. In his dissent to the denial of the petition for rehearing en
banc, Judge Kozinski echoed Judge Alarcon’s reasoning. See White v. Samsung
Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority went too far by “not allowing any means
of reminding people of someone”). Although Judge Alarcon applies his standard
from the perspective of “anyone,” his logic implies that the viewer would need
some familiarity with Vanna White. His reasoning is thus consistent with the
readily identifiable standard. See supra note 332 and accompanying text
(clarifying that the readily identifiable standard applies from the position of a
person who is familiar with the celebrity).
338. See White, 971 F.2d at 1405 (contending that the robot’s image is
clearly distinct from White’s and asserting that “[t]he Wheel of Fortune
set . . . is not an attribute of Vanna White’s identity”).
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Alarcon’s opinion is a great example of applying the readily
identifiable standard.
Additional precedent supports the readily identifiable
standard, although not necessarily its “immediately” and
“definitively” language or its application in the video game
context. In Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc.,339 a right of privacy
case, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that a photograph
violates an individual’s right of privacy only if “someone familiar
with the person[] in the photograph could identify them by
looking at [it].”340 The court explained that this determination
requires a court to consider how clear the person’s image is and
any other features in the picture that help show whether it does
or does not depict the individual.341 It determined that the
photograph of a nude mother and child was similar enough to the
plaintiffs’ images to justify the jury’s determination.342 The New
York Supreme Court later applied the Cohen test in a right of
publicity case.343 The court concluded that the defendant, a
baseball jersey manufacturer, violated New York Mets players’
rights of publicity because someone familiar with the plaintiffs
could identify their images on the jersey at issue.344
It is easiest to highlight the readily identifiable standard’s
intricacies by explaining what factors a court applying the test
339. 472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984).
340. Id. at 308; see also Eames, supra note 48, at 52 (citing Cohen in the
process of explaining how courts resolve right of publicity issues involving noncelebrities). Many courts use this “someone familiar with” principle, which the
readily identifiable standard adopts, to evaluate right of publicity claims. See,
e.g., Cheatham v. Paisano Publ’ns, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 387 (W.D. Ky. 1995)
(explaining that the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim hinged on whether “her
friends and customers” could identify her from the photograph).
341. See Cohen, 472 N.E.2d at 309 (explaining that the result “will
necessarily depend upon the court’s determination of the quality and quantity of
the identifiable characteristics displayed in the advertisement and . . . an
assessment of the clarity of the photograph, the extent to which identifying
features are visible, and the distinctiveness of those features”).
342. See id. (noting similarities between the plaintiffs’ physical features and
those in the photograph and reasoning that the plaintiffs were more identifiable
because they were together in the photograph).
343. See Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933–34 (1995) (citing
Cohen and quoting its standard).
344. See id. at 934 (describing the similarities between the players and the
image on the jersey and explaining that baseball fans, as persons familiar with
the plaintiffs, could identify them from the jersey).
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will and will not consider. In short, the standard will consider all
of a video game’s features that can be seen and heard but will not
consider nonobservable components that do not help determine
whether an individual’s likeness is immediately and definitively
identifiable. In the context of an individual’s image, for example,
the readily identifiable standard will consider a game’s setting
and an avatar’s surroundings. The game board scene in White, if
the advertisement had been part of a video game, is a prime
example of such a setting.345 A court applying this test would
have also considered the space-age setting of Space Channel 5 in
Kirby346 and the impressively lifelike stadiums in Hart and Keller
that are filled with countless realistic avatars.347
The readily identifiable standard will also consider an
avatar’s unique characteristics because these aid in the decision
of whether an avatar is immediately and definitively based on a
right of publicity plaintiff. For example, the height, weight, and
biographical information given in the NCAA Football games helps
show what athlete an avatar is based on, even in the absence of a
name.348 If the White advertisement were in a video game, a court
applying the readily identifiable standard would consider the
robot’s dress and jewelry that resembled those that White wore in
real life.349
Finally, this new test will consider the sounds made and
actions taken by a video game’s avatars. A court applying the
readily identifiable standard would thus consider what songs No
Doubt sang in Band Hero, just as the court that applied the
transformative use test did.350 If Ginger Rogers were in a video
345. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that the White
court considered the game show scene).
346. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 59 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) (describing how the game is set in the 2400s).
347. See In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.
(Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013) (identifying the presence of
“realistic virtual versions of actual stadiums” filled with “virtual athletes,
coaches, cheerleaders, and fans”).
348. See supra note 197 (describing the similarities between characters in
the NCAA Football games and the athletes in real life).
349. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir.
1992) (noting the similarity between the robot’s clothing and accessories and
those of Vanna White).
350. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1034
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game, a court applying the readily identifiable standard would
consider her dancing style.351 A court using this test would also
consider a baseball player’s batting stance, a celebrity’s famous
expressions, and an individual’s tattoos352 because these too
factor into the immediately and definitively identifiable analysis.
The readily identifiable standard will not consider a video
game’s components that a user cannot observe. Examples include
the ability to alter characters, settings, and other aspects of the
game.353 As the Third Circuit reasoned in Hart, changing a video
game’s avatar creates a new character.354 Likewise, the readily
identifiable standard will ignore interactivity—a user’s ability to
control an avatar and the avatar’s activity.355 Interactivity does
not change the avatar’s potential appropriation of an individual’s
likeness and is thus not appropriate for evaluating a right of
publicity claim.356 Considering either changeability or
interactivity is also a problem because doing so would provide
video game producers an easy avenue around right of publicity
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that No Doubt in Band Hero sang songs that
the real band maintained it would never have sung).
351. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that Rogers
became famous for dancing with Fred Astaire in films).
352. Meredith Hatic argues that tattoos can be a large part of a person’s
likeness that the right of publicity must protect. See Meredith Hatic, Note, Who
Owns Your Body Art?: The Copyright and Constitutional Implications of Tattoos,
23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 396, 420 (2012) (asserting that the
right of publicity gives former NBA star Rasheed Wallace an interest to protect
his image, which includes his tattoos).
353. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 168 (“[T]he mere ability to change the
virtual players’ appearances should not . . . end the analysis where the intent of
the game makers is to mimic reality.”).
354. See supra notes 219–220 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s
reasoning about minor and major alterations of video game characters). A video
game user’s creation of an avatar that closely resembles a famous person has no
right of publicity consequences as the user will not profit from the celebrity’s
likeness. See Rodrigues, supra note 271, at 1202 (“The right of publicity is a
property right in the commercial use of one’s persona.” (emphasis added)).
355. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2767–77 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining the interactive component of video games
and arguing that interactivity distinguishes video games from movies and
books).
356. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (explaining Gutmann’s
argument that courts should not consider the ability to control video game
avatars in balancing the right of publicity and the First Amendment because it
does not change the avatar).
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liability.357 The companies could simply incorporate these
features into a game, which would be “merely a guise to escape
liability.”358 Courts must thus evaluate a video game in its default
form and without giving any weight to interactivity or
changeability.359
A video game producer’s intent is another component that
users cannot observe and that courts applying the readily
identifiable standard will not consider. In Zacchini, the Supreme
Court of the United States rejected the Ohio Supreme Court’s
right of publicity test that had considered intent.360 Although the
TCI Cablevision court argued that ignoring intent might allow
video game companies to escape liability for intentional
appropriation,361 any depiction of an individual that does not
violate that person’s right of publicity under the readily
identifiable standard is not appropriation at all.362 The new test
thus avoids the problem TCI Cablevision anticipated.363 Lastly,
determining a video game producer’s intent is extremely difficult
to discern364 and may sometimes require a trier of fact to guess as
to the producer’s intent.365
357. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining
that it is dangerous to consider the ability to alter avatars in right of publicity
cases).
358. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 454 (6th Cir. 2003); see Hart,
717 F.3d at 167 (warning that changeability alone cannot give a video game
First Amendment protection because this would “open[ ] the door to cynical
abuse” as “video game companies could commit the most blatant acts of
misappropriation only to absolve themselves by including a feature that allows
users to modify the digital likenesses”).
359. See supra notes 284–285 and accompanying text (explaining the need
for evaluation in the default form).
360. See Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977)
(explaining that the Ohio Supreme Court incorrectly considered whether the
television station intended to appropriate Zacchini’s likeness).
361. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(arguing that balancing the right of publicity and the First Amendment requires
considering intent).
362. See Bucher, supra note 26, at 1–2 (explaining that appropriation
requires using an individual’s identity to one’s own advantage).
363. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining the TCI
Cablevision court’s fear of willful commercial exploitation).
364. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (describing the challenging
task of discerning intent).
365. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First
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The readily identifiable standard advances the goals of a
workable test discussed in Part V.A and other public policy
concerns in three ways. First, the test allocates the proper
amount of First Amendment protection.366 The readily
identifiable standard is strict by design.367 As noted above, video
game companies should receive significant First Amendment
protection because there is a low risk that consumers will decide
to use or buy a game based on how the game depicts celebrities.368
Entertainment is one of the primary means of expression under
the First Amendment, and celebrities are in the unique, and
arguably unenviable, position of often being the subjects of this
expression.369 A balancing test, like the readily identifiable
standard, that favors creativity is not intended to allow video
game producers to exploit celebrities.370 The test is, however,
designed to protect the freedom of expression that “is
fundamental in our society” in an arena where policy favors First
Amendment protection.371
Second, the readily identifiable standard protects the average
person who is equally entitled to a right of publicity if her state
recognizes the right.372 Noncelebrities, although not recognizable
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 740
(1975) (warning of the “risks to speech if juries were permitted to punish on the
basis of guesses about intent”).
366. See supra note 325 and accompanying text (advocating that a workable
test must properly consider the First Amendment).
367. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 63 (asserting that the proper balance
between the First Amendment and moral rights like the right of publicity
requires “a ‘thumb on the scales’ in favor of free speech”).
368. See supra notes 328–330 and accompanying text (contending that the
low risk of consumer confusion as compared with titles of works necessitates
additional First Amendment protection for video games).
369. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803
(Cal. 2001) (explaining that the way that people view celebrities can make “the
creative appropriation of celebrity images . . . an important avenue of individual
expression”).
370. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 119–20 (warning of the danger that would
result from overexploitation of celebrities’ images).
371. Id. at 134.
372. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 129 (arguing that the right of publicity
protects, “at a minimum the names and likenesses of every individual” because
celebrities and non-celebrities alike can be identified by their names and
likenesses). The fact that courts designed the right of publicity to protect
celebrities, supra note 49, does not preclude the right from also protecting non-
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on a national or international scale, have “regionally known
personas.”373 The readily identifiable standard protects these
personas by applying specifically from the perspective of “a
person familiar with the individual.”374
Finally, the readily identifiable standard gives video game
companies a workable standard that they can rely on.375 The
answer to the question of whether an individual is immediately
and definitively identifiable from an avatar is easier to predict
than the answer to whether the work is sufficiently
transformative or whether creative aspects of the game
predominate.376 And, significantly, protecting video game
producers in this way will in turn protect celebrities. A video
game company’s knowledge of what line it cannot cross protects
celebrities because the fear of lawsuits will deter the company
from crossing this line.377
C. Applying the Readily Identifiable Standard to Existing
Precedent
This Note does not, in the absence of a complete factual
record, purport to predict for certain how a court applying the
readily identifiable standard would decide the cases outlined in
Part III.B. Applying the test’s guidelines to these decisions can,
nevertheless, help to clarify how a court would likely apply this
celebrities. Ann Margaret Eames clarifies that celebrity status is not a
requirement for bringing a right of publicity claim. See Eames, supra note 48, at
51 (explaining that the right of publicity presently protects celebrities and noncelebrities alike, although previous courts would have rejected a non-celebrity’s
right of publicity action because “her image [was] fungible”).
373. KWALL, supra note 47, at 128.
374. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (explaining that the readily
identifiable standard applies from this viewpoint).
375. See supra notes 323–324 and accompanying text (noting the need for a
consistent standard that video game producers can put their faith in).
376. See supra notes 305–306, 311 (explaining that both the predominant
use test and transformative use test are too subjective and difficult to apply
consistently).
377. See Holly Forsberg, Diminishing the Attractiveness of Trolling: The
Impacts of Recent Judicial Activity on Non–Practicing Entities, 12 U. PITT. J.
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2011) (noting that the fear of possible litigation deters
production in the intellectual property arena).
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test and what factors a court would consider in analyzing these
decisions.
The most significant factor in applying the readily
identifiable standard to Kirby’s facts is the tremendous difference
in appearance between Ulala and Kierin Kirby.378 The Kirby
court identified significant contrasts, including size, fashion style,
and Ulala being an anime character.379 Beyond these differences
in appearance, the “futuristic setting”380 weighs against Kirby.381
Finally, the difference between Kirby’s “Groove is in the Heart”
and the music in Space Channel 5 decreases the likelihood of
associating Kirby with Ulala.382 These differences make it
probable that Kirby’s likeness is not immediately and definitively
identifiable from Ulala’s image.
It is harder to analyze Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s, the
game at issue in Romantics, because the court did not extensively
compare the band’s original song with the game’s version.383
Romantics also presents an unusual case because the game
acknowledges that the song belongs to The Romantics.384 The
Romantics court notes that this gives users notice that The
Romantics are not performing “What I Like About You” in the
game.385 This reasoning aligns with the readily identifiable
standard because this disclaimer would make it less likely that a
user would be able to immediately and definitively identify The
Romantics from the band in the game.386 Because the band did
378. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 59–60 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (describing the differences in appearance).
379. See id. at 59 (explaining that Ulala and Kirby “differ quite a bit”).
380. Id. at 51.
381. See supra note 346 and accompanying text (explaining that a court
applying the readily identifiable standard would consider Space Channel 5’s
setting).
382. See Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 51 (explaining that Space Channel 5’s
theme song “Mexican Flyer,” by Ken Woodman, is not associated with Kirby or
her band Deee-Lite).
383. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765 (E.D.
Mich. 2008) (noting that the band “presented no evidence that their sound is
identifiable separate from the [s]ong”).
384. See id. at 762 (noting that the game displays the words “as made
famous by The Romantics”).
385. See id. (asserting that this disclaimer “informs players and onlookers
that The Romantics are not actually performing the [s]ong”).
386. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (stressing the difficulty of
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not point to any visual similarities between itself and the band in
the game,387 it is unlikely that the two were visually similar.
Additionally, a court applying the readily identifiable standard
would not consider the user’s ability to “customize [the] game
play experience” as the Romantics court did.388 The factors thus
seem to weigh against The Romantics and toward First
Amendment protection for the game, just as the court held under
the predominant use test.389
No Doubt is an atypical case because the band members
agreed to appear in the game before later alleging that Activision
violated the licensing agreement.390 Activision thus likely violated
the plaintiffs’ rights of publicity under the readily identifiable
standard if the band members were not immediately and
definitively identifiable from their avatars.391 Whether the
avatars resembled the real band members was not an issue.392
But a court applying the readily identifiable standard to these
facts would still evaluate the game’s other elements.393 For
example, a court would consider that a Band Hero user can make
No Doubt “perform at fanciful venues including outer space or to
sing songs [that No Doubt] would object to singing” because these
are observable features.394 The readily identifiable standard
would also consider, however, that the avatars performed solely
rock songs just as No Doubt did in real life.395 It makes no
satisfying this test).
387. See Romantics, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (clarifying that the plaintiffs’
claim related to sound).
388. Id. at 766.
389. See id. (concluding that the plaintiffs’ right of publicity claim failed).
390. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1022
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining No Doubt’s claim that the video game publisher
used the members’ likenesses in ways that violated the agreement).
391. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (clarifying that a court will
normally apply the test by asking whether the plaintiff is immediately and
definitively identifiable).
392. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1033 (noting that Activision
acknowledged the intentional visual similarities).
393. See supra Part V.B (explaining that a court applying the readily
identifiable standard would consider all of a game’s observable components).
394. No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1034.
395. See id. (observing that the game’s avatars do exactly what made No
Doubt famous).
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difference under the readily identifiable standard that the game
does not permit users to change the avatars.396 The band
members would thus likely succeed under this test if the
differences in setting, style, and song choice outweighed the
visual resemblances to the extent that the plaintiffs were not
immediately and definitively identifiable.
Hart and Keller are likely the easiest of these five cases
under the readily identifiable standard. The NCAA Football
games include many observable components that a court applying
the test would consider.397 First, visual similarities between the
avatars and real athletes, supplemented by the biographical
information, go a long way toward immediate and definitive
identification.398 Second, the games place avatars in the “very
setting” that the real athletes appear.399 Unlike the unrealistic
venues in No Doubt, the NCAA Football games include few
fictional elements.400 Third, other recognizable avatars surround
a player, which makes identification easier.401
Although the NCAA Football video games feature various
game modes,402 the readily identifiable standard evaluates a
game in its default form.403 In the NCAA Football series, this is

396. See id. at 1033 (noting that Band Hero lacks a changeability feature);
supra notes 357–358 and accompanying text (explaining why the readily
identifiable standard does not consider changeability).
397. See supra Part III.B.4 (identifying many of the games’ observable
contents).
398. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text (describing the realistic
depictions of Hart and Keller in NCAA Football 2005); supra note 348 and
accompanying text (explaining that the test would consider these features
because they are easily observable).
399. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.
(Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013).
400. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir. 2013)
(distinguishing Hart from No Doubt by noting that “the various digitized sights
and sounds in [NCAA Football] do not alter or transform [Hart’s] identity in a
significant way”).
401. See supra note 342 (explaining that the Cohen court weighed the
presence of other identifiable individuals in the plaintiffs’ favor).
402. See supra notes 201–202 and accompanying text (explaining two of the
game modes).
403. See supra note 358–359 and accompanying text (rationalizing that
evaluation in the default form averts the problem of video game companies
avoiding liability by including a changeability feature).
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the traditional single game mode.404 The games’ changeability
feature will not save Electronic Arts under the readily
identifiable standard as it nearly did in Hart.405 A court applying
this test would thus likely reach the same result as the Third and
Ninth Circuits did in Hart and Keller and reject Electronic Arts’
First Amendment defense.406
VI. Conclusion
The right of publicity’s current direction in video game cases
necessitates change. Courts have inconsistently, illogically, and
unjustifiably applied the right of publicity in these cases. Current
tests do not adequately consider the First Amendment, resulting
in a group of video game cases that are somewhat consistent but
are foundationally wrong. Scholars’ suggested adaptations to
these tests represent modest improvements at best. Having a
black and white test that courts can easily apply in the same way
to all video games is the optimal situation. Such a test would
obviate the need for any discussion on the issue and even for this
Note itself. The fact-specific nature of each video game, however,
unfortunately makes this ideal scenario impracticable.407
The readily identifiable standard is the next best thing. It is
workable, predictable, and protects video game companies’ First
Amendment rights. By considering video games’ observable
features while ignoring their invisible characteristics like
changeability and intent, the readily identifiable standard
returns to what the Haelan court designed the right of publicity
to protect. States need to adopt this test before the increasing
404. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (describing the other game modes as
“additional game modes” that have each been part of a newer version of the
game).
405. See id. at 166–69 (discussing the ability to alter avatars in detail after
noting that Electronic Arts would have little, if any, defense if the games had no
changeability feature).
406. See id. at 170 (concluding that the First Amendment did not protect the
NCAA Football games); In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013) (same).
407. See Matthew J. Mitten, A Triple Play for the Public Domain: Delaware
Lottery to Motorola to C.B.C., 11 CHAP. L. REV. 569, 579 n.71 (2008) (noting that
the right of publicity analysis in the video game context is particularly difficult
because the balancing will be somewhat different in every case).
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number of video games causes this problem to get out of hand. If
states do adopt the readily identifiable standard, future courts
will have a much easier time evaluating the next Kierin Kirby or
Ryan Hart’s right of publicity claim.

